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LIST OF PARTIES
The plaintiffs in the proceedings before the District Court are TruGreen
Companies and TruGreen Limited Partnership.
All of plaintiffs' claims against defendants Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard
Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James
Murray, and Matt Walker were dismissed in the District Court's February 13, 2007 Order
(R.253) (attached as Addendum C).
All of plaintiffs' claims against defendants Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick
Deerfield, David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr were dismissed in the District Court's
June 8, 2007 Order (R.286) (attached as Addendum D).
Thus, the remaining defendants who are the Respondents for purposes of this
appeal include only the following: Kevin D. Bitton, Jean Robert Babilis, Mower
Brothers, Inc., Greensides, LLC, Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, Jim LeBlanc, and David
Stevenson.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court pursuant to the Court's Order of Acceptance,
granting in part the United States District Court's Order Certifying Questions of Law to
the Utah Supreme Court. (Copies of the Order of Acceptance and the Order Certifying
Questions of Law are included as Addenda A and B, respectively.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to the Order of Acceptance, the two issues presented are:
1.

Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost

profits damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a
former employee has breached contractual noncompetition, nondisclosure, and employee
nonsolicitation provisions?
2.

Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for

tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The two questions certified by the District Court are questions of state law. "On
certification, we 'answer the legal questions presented' without 'resolving the underlying
dispute.'" In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71,1 6, 99 P.3d 793 (quoting Spackman ex rel
Spackman v. Board ofEduc, 2000 UT 87, % 1 n.2, 16 P.3d 533).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
No statutory or constitutional provisions are determinative of this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the
United States District Court,

This action was commenced by Petitioners TruGreen Companies and TruGreen
Limited Partnership (collectively "TruGreen") in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah. R.l. 1 TruGreen sued Kevin D. Bitton, Jean Robert Babilis, Mower
Brothers, Inc. ("Mower Brothers") (a company owned by Bitton and in which Babilis is
involved), and Greensides, LLC ("Greensides") (a former owner of Mower Brothers'
Idaho franchise) (collectively the "Mower Brothers Defendants"). Mower Brothers owns
Scotts Lawn Service ("SLS") franchises in Utah, Idaho, and Oregon, through which
Mower Brothers provides lawn, tree and shrub fertilization services to consumers.
Mower Brothers and TruGreen are direct competitors. R.184ativ-v.
TruGreen named as additional defendants several former TruGreen employees
who were hired by Mower Brothers: Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, Jim LeBlanc, David
Stevenson, Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, David Van Acker, Tammy
Roehr, Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith,
Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker. R.l 15. These
individuals had served in such positions for TruGreen as customer service representative,
auditor, technician, sales representative, or service manager. R.l84 at vi, xiv-xvii.

References to the record are designated as R. (e.g., R.l). The record number
refers to the document number of the document being referenced as reflected in the
federal district court's docket report for this case.
2
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TruGreen claimed that the Mower Brothers Defendants tortiously interfered with
TruGreen's employee and customer contracts and relations, and claimed that each of the
former employees it sued tortiously interfered with TruGreen's relations with customers
and employees, and also breached various provisions in their employment agreements.
Defendants dispute TruGreen's allegations.
TruGreen sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to
enjoin its former employees from working for Mower Brothers, and to enjoin Mower
Brothers from employing them. The District Court denied both motions after expedited
discovery, briefing, and oral argument. R.14, 112.
TruGreen and defendants later filed cross motions for summary judgment on most
of the issues raised in the parties' pleadings. In an Order dated February 13, 2007
(attached as Addendum C), the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all
of the former employee defendants on TruGreen's tortious interference claims, in favor
of a number of former employee defendants on TruGreen's various contract claims, and
in favor of all defendants on TruGreen's punitive damages claims. R.253. The District
Court dismissed completely all of TruGreen's claims against Jason Beck, Paul Brower,
Richard Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen,
James Murray, and Matt Walker. R.253. The February 13, 2007 Order also rejected
TruGreen's motion for summary judgment. What remained for trial after summary
judgment is a few contract claims against a few former employee defendants, and
TruGreen's tortious interference claims against the Mower Brothers Defendants.

3
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After entry of summary judgment in defendants' favor and prior to certifying
questions to this Court, the District Court made various rulings regarding damages
experts. TruGreen had designated F. Wayne Elggren, Mitch Smith, and David Armitage
as expert witnesses. R. 167. Rather than contend that TruGreen had suffered lost profits
as a result of alleged breaches of contract or tortious interference, Elggren opined that
TruGreen's damages were Mower Brothers' gross revenues. R.169 at 4-8; 253 at 37-38.
Defendants moved to strike Elggren's report and moved to preclude him from testifying
at trial on the ground that Elggren's conclusions and opinions were not sufficiently
reliable under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. R.202; 205 at 9-12; 253 at 37.
In its February 13, 2007 Order, the District Court granted defendants' motion to
exclude Elggren under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993),
and Rule 702, concluding that Elggren had based his conclusions on assumptions not
supported by facts in the record, and failed to consider many factors for a proper
assessment of damages. R.253 at 35-43. Specifically, the District Court concluded that
Elggren's report "does not seriously contend with potentially confounding causes of
revenue gains and losses," and addresses none of the undisputed factors that would have
to be taken into account in developing such a damages calculation:
a.
The specific items of confidential information that allegedly
were taken by each Defendant who previously worked for TruGreen,
including the impact that the use of each specific element of the
confidential information could have on alleged damage elements including
sales, profits, margins, expenses, and management efficiencies.
b.
Historical patterns of financial performance by TruGreen and
how performance allegedly was impacted by the Defendants' alleged acts.

4
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c.
Identification of which customers TruGreen allegedly lost to
Mower Brothers as a result of the actions of the Defendants, or which
customers allegedly were obtained by Mower Brothers as a result of
allegedly using TruGreen's confidential information, utilizing the customer
databases from both TruGreen and Mower Brothers.
d.
Analysis that would show that but for the actions of the
Defendants, TruGreen would have obtained the revenues obtained by
Mower Brothers.
e.
The dates that each defendant quit TruGreen and/or their
subsequent hire date at Mower Brothers and the impact each Defendant
allegedly caused to damages.
f.
The effect of TruGreen's Ogden location closing and its
impact on both Defendants' decision to leave TruGreen and damages
allegedly resulting therefrom.
g.
Alternative reasons for TruGreen's decreased sales and
profitability in 2006, including levels of advertising, weather, regional
economic factors, population growth, publicity, market acceptance of
products and services, business life cycle issues, pricing differences,
competitive forces, quality of products and customer services, and
management decisions.
h.
Alternative reasons for Mower Brothers' increased sales and
profitability in 2006, including levels of advertising, weather, regional
economic factors, population growth, publicity, market acceptance of
products and services, business life cycle issues, pricing differences,
competitive forces, quality of products and customer services, and
management decisions.
i.
Alternative reasons as to why Mower Brothers was able to
retain customers in 2006 that it obtained in 2005 other than by using
confidential information from defendants, including levels of advertising,
weather, regional economic factors, population growth, publicity, market
acceptance of products and services, business life cycle issues, pricing
differences, competitive forces, quality of products and customer services,
and management decisions.
R.253 at 39-40. Based on these failures, the District Court concluded that Mr. Elggren's
report was unreliable and should be stricken and excluded.

5
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After making its ruling regarding Elggren, the District Court directed the parties to
provide additional briefing on the impact of the District Court's striking of Elggren's
expert report on damages and the exclusion of his damages testimony at trial. R.253 at
43, 44. Defendants filed damages memoranda arguing that given the lack of any
evidence that TruGreen had suffered lost profits or other actual damages resulting from
defendants' conduct, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants on the
remaining claims against them. R.256, 261.
TruGreen filed its own damages memoranda, claiming that it was entitled to
recover on its breach of contract and tortious interference claims under an "unjust
enrichment" theory of damages based solely on defendants' alleged gains—as an
alternative to its failed attempt to prove any lost profits. R.255, 263, 286. TruGreen did
not assert that its former employees' actual earnings with Mower Brothers or Mower
Brothers' own gains served as a proxy to show its own lost profits, but instead claimed
that it was entitled to complete disgorgement of all revenue earned by Mower Brothers,
including revenue obtained from the customers who did business with Mower Brothers
before it hired former TruGreen employees, and even revenue from customers who had
never done business with TruGreen. R.263 at 12-14.
Considering the parties' damages briefing, the District Court entered a June 8,
2007 Order (attached as Addendum D) providing additional summary judgment rulings
in defendants' favor. R.286. In the June 8 Order, the District Court ruled that "TruGreen
has failed to provide the District Court with evidence that would raise a reasonable
inference supporting causation and damages" and that "TruGreen has failed to provide
6
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any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection between TruGreen's alleged
damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of the Defendants." R.286 at 8. In fact, as the
District Court stated, "TruGreen has failed to produce any evidence of what damage to
TruGreen is attributable to any of the Defendants." R.286 at 8.
This Order granted summary judgment in favor of all claims against TruGreen's
former employees who worked in Idaho—Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield,
David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr. R.286 at 13. The District Court determined that
under applicable Idaho law, the proper measure of damages for the claims at issue is lost
profits caused by those defendants—and not the "restitutionary measure of damages"
proposed by TruGreen. Since TruGreen offered no evidence that any alleged lost profits
were caused by these Idaho employees' alleged conduct, claims against them were
dismissed entirely. R.286 at 10-11.
The District Court cited Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983), a case
for breach of a covenant not to compete, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a
"plaintiff must prove that he was injured by the breach and show the amount of damage
caused to him. The measure of damages is not the amount of profits made by the
defendant, rather it is the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach." Id
at 61; R.286 at 10. The District Court also cited Nora v. Safeco Ins. Co., 557 P.2d 347

The June 8, 2007 Order also denied a motion of TruGreen to reconsider the
rulings regarding Elggren, and granted defendants' motion to exclude the damages expert
testimony of Mitch Smith, which established that Smith lacked personal knowledge of
facts sufficient to calculate or formulate a reliable opinion regarding damages purportedly
suffered by TruGreen. R.267, 268, 270, 286.
7
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(Idaho 1978), a tortious interference case supporting a lost profits theory, in which the
Idaho Supreme Court noted that "in cases of tortious interference with an established
business that damages for loss of anticipated earnings or profits must be shown with
reasonable certainty." Id.
With respect to the remaining claim of tortious interference against the Mower
Brothers Defendants and the contract claims against the Utah-based former TruGreen
employee defendants remaining in the case—Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and
Stevenson—the District Court determined that no Utah court has opined regarding the
proper measure of damages for tortious interference with contractual and economic
relationships or for breach of noncompetition, nondisclosure, and employee
nonsolicitation provisions in an employment agreement.
After considering proposed orders submitted by the parties (R.276-79), the District
Court proposed two questions regarding these Utah contract and tort law issues in its
Certification Order (attached as Addendum B.) This Court's Order of Acceptance
followed (attached as Addendum A).

The Certification Order also included a question regarding the meaning of
"actual damages" as set forth in the Utah Unfair Competition Act, which this Court
rejected by not including it in its Order of Acceptance. R.287. TruGreen's stautory
unfair competition claim against these few remaining defendants has not been resolved.
8
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B.

Statement of Facts

Mower Brothers, a local company, competes with TruGreen in the lawn, tree, and
shrub fertilization business through SLS franchises that Mower Brothers owns in Utah,
Idaho, and Oregon. TruGreen operates similar branch offices throughout the United
States. R.184ativ-v.
In October, 2005, Mantz, who at the time was the manager of TruGreen5 s Ogden
branch, called Bitton, told him that his job at TruGreen was being eliminated, and stated
that he wanted to talk about coming to work at Mower Brothers. Mower Brothers met
with and hired Mantz in November 2005 as the manager in Mower Brothers' Salt Lake
branch. R.184atviii.
Some of Mantz's friends at TruGreen called him and asked if there were jobs
available at Mower Brothers. Mantz said they needed to contact Bitton or Babilis. R.193
at xii-xiii. In November, 2005, Gaythwaite left TruGreen's Ogden branch, called Bitton
inquiring about a job with Mower Brothers, and was hired as the sales manager of Mower
Brothers' Salt Lake branch. R.184 at ix. In December 2005, LeBlanc, a salesman in
TruGreen's Ogden branch, called Bitton about employment at Mower Brothers, and was
hired as a salesman in its Salt Lake branch. R. 184 at ix-x. In January 2006, Stephensen
contacted Bitton and was hired as a salesman in Mower Brothers' Ogden branch. R.184
at v.
Mower Brothers did not ask, direct or encourage any former TruGreen employees
to induce or encourage other TruGreen employees to terminate their employment or go to
work for Mower Brothers. Mower Brothers hired Mantz, LeBlanc, Stephensen and
9
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Gaythwaite only after they contacted Mower Brothers and applied for a position. Mower
Brothers hired them to fill available positions and further Mower Brothers' business
interests, and not to harm TruGreen's business. R.184 at xxiv.
In January 2006, TruGreen's counsel sent letters to Mower Brothers indicating
that Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen had signed noncompete agreements
with TruGreen, and providing copies of those agreements. Prior to this time, Mower
Brothers had no knowledge of the terms of these agreements. R. 184 at xi-xii.
The letters regarding Mantz and Stephensen did not state that these individuals
were prohibited from competing with TruGreen or working for Mower Brothers. Indeed,
the noncompete agreements of these employees did not prohibit them from competing
with TruGreen after their employment with TruGreen ended. R. 184 at xii. For these
reasons, Mower Brothers continued to employ Mantz as the branch manager of Mower
Brothers' Salt Lake branch and Stephensen as a salesman in Mower Brothers' Ogden
branch. R.184 at xii.
The noncompete agreements that accompanied the letters regarding Gaythwaite
and LeBlanc stated that these employees may not compete with TruGreen for one year
and for six months, respectively, after their employment at TruGreen ends in the
geographic area in which they were assigned duties during the last six months of their
employment with TruGreen. Because Gaythwaite and LeBlanc had been employed in
TruGreen's Ogden branch office during their last six months at TruGreen, and were
working for Mower Brothers in its Salt Lake branch office, Mower Brothers understood
that their employment did not violate their TruGreen agreements. R. 184 at xii-xiii.
10
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Mower Brothers later learned that LeBlanc signed a new noncompete agreement
with TruGreen, replacing the one provided by Pearson, that did not prohibit LeBlanc
from competing with TruGreen after his employment at TruGreen ended but only while
he was employed at TruGreen. R. 184 at xiii.
Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen did not bring with them to Mower
Brothers any written TruGreen materials, such as customer lists or financial data.
Moreover, Mower Brothers has not asked or allowed these former TruGreen employees
to divulge or use any confidential information or trade secret of TruGreen, and these
employees have not disclosed or used such information. Indeed, these former TruGreen
employees do not recall any specific confidential information of TruGreen that they may
have seen or heard while employed there, and they did not use or disclose to Mower
Brothers any such information while working for Mower Brothers. R. 184 at xi-xii.
In any event, the various information that these former TruGreen employees may
have received from TruGreen during their employment is not confidential or trade secret.
R.193 at xiv-xxxiv. Moreover, Mower Brothers does not even use or allow employees to
use sales techniques, marketing strategies, direct mail advertising strategies, pricing,
product or equipment information, or financial information from previous employers
because it has its own materials deployed to all SLS franchisees. R.184 at xi-xii.
Mower Brothers has not asked, directed, or encouraged these four former
TruGreen employees to contact individuals known to them to be TruGreen customers to
solicit their business for Mower Brothers. Mantz, LeBlanc, Stephensen and Gaythwaite
have not contacted any person known to them to be a TruGreen customer since going to
11
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work for Mower Brothers for the purpose of soliciting the person's business for Mower
Brothers. Mower Brothers has not targeted TruGreen's customers in its advertising or
otherwise sought to solicit business specifically from TruGreen customers. Mower
Brothers has no knowledge of the identity of TruGreen's customers. R.184 at xxiii.
Mower Brothers markets its services and products through direct mail advertising
purchased from SLS. The name and address of the mail recipients come from mail lists
purchased by SLS from national list companies. When a mail recipient contacts Mower
Brothers by return postcard or telephone to inquire about SLS's products and services,
the postcard or call is forwarded randomly to a sales representative who responds to the
potential customer, answers their questions and attempts to sell them products or services.
Mower Brothers does not attempt to learn the identity of, or target, their competitors'
customers in order to contact them to solicit their business. R.184 at v-vi. 4
Any coincidental contact that Mower Brothers' sales reps may have had with
current or former customers of TruGreen was not done with an improper purpose or by
improper means. R.253 at 2, 22-31.
Defendants' expert, Derk Rasmussen, performed an exhaustive analysis of
TruGreen's customer database (with its 423,590 names) and Mower Brothers' (with its
165,158 names) to determine which customers switched from TruGreen to Mower
Brothers, as well as the reasons for the switch. R.240 at ^ 201-25. The data revealed
that 2447 names contained in TruGreen's data base became customers of Mower
Brothers after TruGreen employees were hired. R.240 at ^| 204. Of this number, only 57
had interactions with the same employee at both TruGreen and Mower Brothers. R.240
at Tf 221. Only 12 matching employees had switched from TruGreen to Mower Brothers
within one year from their last service at TruGreen, had cancel comments that showed
they left TruGreen for reasons unrelated to the Defendant Employees, and had interaction
with the same employee at both companies. R.240 at ^[222. None of the matching
customers met all of the cross comparison criteria. R.240 at Tf 222.
12
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first certified question is resolved by resorting to well-established,
fundamental principles of contract law. Put simply, the measure of damages for breach
of contract is the loss to the plaintiff occasioned by the breach. Notions of restitution or
unjust enrichment have no place in an action for contract damages. Here, the damages to
TruGreen for breach of the various employment agreement covenants would be limited to
lost profits or other similar damage to TruGreen that was caused by its former
employees' alleged breaches. There is no authority in Utah for awarding in such breach
of contract cases the earnings of the former employees or the revenues or profits of their
new employer (which is what TruGreen now seeks). Moreover, the case law is
overwhelming from other jurisdictions that for breaches of contract provisions similar to
those before the Court, damages are measured by the employer's loss and not the
employee's gain. Considering these authorities, the Court should answer the first
certified question by holding that Utah does not recognize an unjust enrichment or
restitutionary measure of damages for breaches of employment agreements.
The second certified question is resolved by this Court's examination of the law of
torts generally and tortious interference specifically. This Court has held—as have other
courts interpreting Utah law and the law of a large majority of other states—that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover its loss actually and proximately caused by the defendant's
tortious interference, and not restitution or unjust enrichment. Considering this authority,
the second certified question—whether Utah recognizes restitution or unjust enrichment
as a remedy for tortious interference—should be resolved in the negative.
13
SLC_127638

ARGUMENT
I.

THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN UTAH FOR BREACH OF
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS IS THE EMPLOYER'S ACTUAL LOST
PROFITS RESULTING FROM THE BREACH.
The first certified question is answered by basic principles of contract law. While

there may be little authority from this Court detailing the standards for measuring
damages for breach of the particular employment agreement provisions before the Court
in this case, there is no basis for casting aside the fundamental notion that contractual
remedies center on the nonbreaching party's loss, and not the breaching party's gain.
Moreover, even looking to other jurisdictions specifically addressing similar contract
language, the authority is overwhelming that an employer's damages are based on the
employer's own losses caused by the breach, and not the ex-employee's gain. Based on
this authority, the Court should answer the first certified question by holding that an
employer's damages for breach of contract consist of its lost profits resulting from the
breach, and not some restitutionary or unjust enrichment measure of damages centered
solely on the breaching party's gain.
A,

Contract Damages Center on the Nonbreaching Party's Lost
Expectation Interest

It is well established in Utah that the proper measure of damages for breach of
contract generally is "the lost fruits of [the] contract" for the nonbreaching party, Baugh
v. Barley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 338-39 (1947), also referred to as the nonbreaching
party's "expectation interest" occasioned by the breach. Ford v. American Express Fin.
Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, \ 39, 98 P.3d 15. Awarding the expectancy interest serves
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the role of contract damages of placing the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if
the contract were performed. Ford, 2004 UT 70 atf 39. The nonbreaching party's
expectation interest is measured by:
"(a) the loss in value to him of the other party's performance
caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b)
any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss,
caused by the breach, less
(c)
perform."

any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347); see also Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 344(a) (1981) (defining "expectation interest" as nonbreaching party's
"interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed").
Contract damages are based on the plaintiffs actual loss caused by the breach so
as to "avoid putting the plaintiff in a better position than he would have occupied but for
the breach." Id. at ^J 37 ("[Compensatory damages exist simply to make the plaintiff
whole by compensating the plaintiff for injuries actually sustained."); see also
Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994)
(stating that contract damages seek to "to place the nonbreaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed" and not punish breaching party).5 These

5

This black-letter rule in Utah for computing contract damages is the same in
other jurisdictions, which generally recognize that the Court should look to the
nonbreaching party's losses, and not the breaching party's gains, in seeking to place the
nonbreaching party in the position it would have been in had the contract been
performed. See, e.g., American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir.
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authorities, standing alone, are sufficient to resolve the first certified question and
conclude that TruGreen would be entitled to recover only its actual losses caused by the
alleged contract breaches in this case.
B,

Unjust Enrichment or Restitution Are Not Proper Measures of
Damages for Breach of Contract.

"Unjust enrichment" or "restitution" is not the proper measure of damages for
breach of contract under Utah law. The remedy of restitution is only available for a
quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claim, where in the absence of an express contract a
contract is implied at law to prevent unjust enrichment at the plaintiffs expense.6 See
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The measure of recovery for
unjust enrichment is the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the defendant's
1975) ("The basic failing of the plaintiffs theory is that the defendant's profits are not
necessarily equivalent to the plaintiffs losses. The defendant's profit margin may be
higher than plaintiffs for any number of reasons—e.g., product more efficiently made or
distributed. To compel defendant to disgorge these profits could give plaintiff a windfall
and penalize the defendant, neither of which serves the purpose of contract damages.");
Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) ("The measure of damages [for
breach of noncompetition agreement] is not the amount of profits made by the defendant,
rather it is the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach. . .. However,
the profits which a defendant realized in violation of his agreement may be considered, in
evidence, if shown to correspond, in whole or in part, with the loss of plaintiff."); D. W.
Trowbridge Ford, Inc. v. Galyen, 262 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Neb. 1978) ("[Tjhe measure of
damages, expressed generally, is the value of the business lost to the plaintiff—not the
gain of defendant, which may be more or less than plaintiffs loss."); Axford v. Price, 61
S.E.2d 637, 642 (W. Va. 1993) (refusing to allow defendant's profits to be measure of
damages for breach of noncompetition agreement because "defendant may upon
reengaging in business by reason of his superior skill and experience make a profit
greater than the loss suffered by plaintiff).
6

A second branch of quantum meruit is a contract implied-in-fact, where a
"contract" is established by conduct. See Davies, 746 P.2d at 269; Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 5 cmt. a (1981). This branch of quantum meruit has no application in this
case where there is an express contract between TruGreen and its former employees.
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gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff, or necessarily the reasonable value
of the plaintiffs services. Id. (internal citations omitted).
In the American Towers case, this Court explained the inapplicability of unjust
enrichment or restitution to contract actions, explaining that the restitutionary remedy for
unjust enrichment "is designed to provide an equitable remedy where one does not exist
at law." American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,
1192-93 (Utah 1996). As a result, "if a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an
express contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment." Id.
at 1193; see also Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978)
("The restitution claim asserted by Mann is easily put to rest. Recovery in quasi contract
is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the
litigation."); Davies, 746 P.2d at 1373 n.8 (holding that doctrine of unjust enrichment and
remedy of restitution associated with that claim are inapplicable in case for breach of
express contract because recovery under unjust enrichment "presupposes that no
enforceable written or oral contract exists").
The Restatement recognizes a contract remedy known as "restitution," but this
remedy does not apply here for multiple reasons. First, the remedy of restitution outlined
in the Restatement is not the breaching party's gains (which TruGreen seeks), but simply
the restoration of a particular benefit that one party had conferred on the other party to the
contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(c) (1981) (defining "restitution
interest" as nonbreaching party's "interest in having restored to him any benefit that he
has conferred on the other party."). Second, this remedy is limited to rescission or other
17
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cases in which a contract fails but benefits have been conferred upon another party,
which is not the case here. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 373-77 (1981)
(outlining various scenarios involving material failure of contract in which restitution is
provided).
Third, alternatively, rescission—and the restitutionary remedy that follows—must
be elected in a timely fashion in lieu of damages—and TruGreen elected damages here.
R.115 (Amended Complaint) at 31-32. See Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671
P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983) (doctrine of election of remedies requires election of either
damages or rescission). Finally, the timely election of rescission presupposes that the
plaintiff can return what it received under the contract, which in this case would involve a
return to its former employees of the value of their services performed under their
O

employment agreements—which TruGreen has never offered and likely will not offer.

7

See also Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) ("As a
general proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an action for
restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where there has been a material
breach of the contract by the other party.") (citing 12 Williston on Contracts § 1455 (3d
ed.)); Brandtjen & Kluge v. Shonka, 2 Utah 2d 223, 272 P.2d 155, 156-57 (1954) ("'The
effect of rescission of an agreement is to put the parties back in the same position they
were in prior to the making of the contract.... After rescission for a breach, there is no
right to damages for such breach. The party rescinding may, however, have a right to
restitution with respect to any performance on his part.'") (citing Am. Jur.)\ Sidney
Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264, 67 P.2d 632, 638 (1937) (restitution
appropriate "'instead of compensation'" if rescission elected).
8

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 384(1) (1981) ("[A] party will not be
granted restitution unless (a) he returns or offers to return, conditional on restitution, any
interest in property that he has received in exchange in substantially as good condition as
when it was received by him, or (b) the court can assure such return in connection with
the relief granted."); Anderson v. Doms, 2003 UT App 241, H 11, 75 P.3d 925 (rescission
entails return to status quo existing before formation of contract).
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In sum, under Utah law, unjust enrichment is an equitable claim that has no place
in this action for breach of contract. And, since this is not a rescission case, the
contractual remedy of restitution is inappropriate for the alleged contractual breaches.
C.

TruGreen's Actual Loss—if Any—Is the Proper Measure of Damages
for the Contract Breaches Alleged Here by TruGreen.

There is no need for any different measure of contract damages for the particular
breaches of employment agreements alleged by TruGreen in this case. As detailed
above, Utah law awards the plaintiffs loss for breach of contract and, in an action for
contract damages, this Court does not recognize remedies of unjust enrichment and
restitution. These standards do not change in an employment contract. Indeed, as
detailed below, the overwhelming authority is that an ex-employee is liable for nothing
more than the employer's lost profits for breach of an employment agreement.
1.

The Employer's Lost Profits Are the Measure of Damages for
Breach of a Covenant Not to Compete.

TruGreen is limited to lost profits on its claim that former employees breached
contractual covenants not to compete. TruGreen cannot resort to the equitable remedy of
unjust enrichment in this contract case and thereby measure damages by its ex-employees
alleged gains. Although this Court has not dealt with this issue directly, in similar
circumstances the Court has indicated that the focus for the breach of such a contract is
the employer's losses attributable to the breach.
In Robbins v. Findlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), the Court considered a covenant
in an employment agreement prohibiting the ex-employee's misuse of customer leads in
competition with the employer, and whether an accompanying liquidated damages
19
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provision could be enforced. Id. at 625. After noting the standard that liquidated
damages provisions will be enforced only "if designed to provide fair compensation for a
breach based on a reasonable relation to actual damage/' id. at 626, the Court considered
the employer's actual estimated lost sales revenue from its leads to determine that the
liquidated damages provision was a "reasonable" estimate of actual damage, see id. at
626-27. By considering solely plaintiffs potential losses in determining "actual
damages," this Court implicitly held that the proper measure of damage for the breach of
a noncompetition agreement is the employer's losses and not the defendant's alleged
gains.
This same standard, followed in the large majority of other jurisdictions, is that
"[t]he proper measure of damages for a breach of a covenant not to compete is the nonbreaching party's losses rather than the breaching party's gains." Robert S. Weiss &
Assoc., Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 225-26 (Conn. 1988) (refusing to grant
damages where only proof of damages was profits gained by former employer from
people solicited in breach of the noncompetition provision).9 The Vermont Supreme
Court explained the basis for this standard as follows:

9

See also Van Dyck Printing Co. v. DiNicola, 648 A.2d 898, 904 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1993) ("Damages for breach of a covenant not to compete are measured by the loss
suffered by the enforcing party."); Turbines, Inc. v. Thompson, 648 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1997) ("[A]bsent an enforceable liquidated damages clause, lost profits are a
proper measure of damages in actions involving covenants not to compete.") (citing
C.J.S. Damages § 79(d) ("The measure of damages for breach of a contract. ..
restraining competition is the loss of profits sustained by the injured party."));
Planmatics, Inc. v. Showers, 137 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622 (W.D. Md. 2001) ("Expectancy
damages for breach of [a noncompetition provision] generally are the profits that would
have been recognized had no breach occurred."); Ancil v. Annerson, 227 P.2d 74, 79
20
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The measure of damages for breach of a non-competition agreement is the
plaintiffs provable loss and not the gain accruing to the defendant by
reason of the breach. The difficulty in producing evidence in support of
this measure of damages does not change the rule that in a contract action
one can only recover the natural and proximate damages caused by the
injury. Plaintiff is entitled to recover only those profits lost on sales which
he might reasonably have made, but for the defendant's breach.

(Idaho 1951) (damages for the breach of a noncompete provision are limited to "only the
net profits lost by plaintiff during the period of time when defendant was obligated to
refrain from engaging in business in competition with plaintiff."); Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. Burnett, 160 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1968) (damages limited to "loss naturally
resulting from the breach"); Horizon Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 241 F.
Supp.2d 1123, 1154 (D. Kan. 2002) (damages limited to "lost profits resulting from
breach"); Chapman & Drake v. Harrington, 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988) (damages based on
lost profits attributable to customers solicited away); National Micrographics Systems,
Inc. v. OCE-Industries, Inc., 465 A.2d 862, 867 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (damages limited to
"profit that would have been realized had no breach occurred"); Clark v. Liberty Natl
Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 564, 568 (Ala. 1992) (damages limited to value of lost contracts
resulting from breach); Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(damages are "loss of income"); Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 722, 728-29
(Ark. 1999) (no damages awarded because no evidence that customers actually left
former employer); Tower Oil & Technology Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1071 (111.
App. Ct. 1981) (limiting damages to "lost profits during the covenant period"); G.T
Mitchell Co. v. Mckey, 599 So. 2d 355, 357 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (damages limited to "loss
sustained and the profit for which [the employer] has been deprived"); Nicholaides v.
Demetri, 195 N.W.2d 793, 793-94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (damages limited to lost
profits); Barone v. Marcisak, 465 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (limiting
damages to "loss sustained by reason of the breach, including the net profits of which the
plaintiff was deprived by the defendant's acts"); Southtech Orthopedics, Inc. v. Dingus,
428 F.Supp.2d 410, 418 (E.D.N.C. 2006) ("North Carolina courts routinely recognize
monetary damages measured by lost profits as adequate to redress a breach of a covenant
not to compete."); Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 278 (D. Ohio 1983)
(damages limited to lost profits); Baker v. Hooper, 50 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001) (same); Riverview Floral v. Watkins, 754 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Wash. Ct. App.
1988) (damages limited to lost profits, but not awarded when speculative); Wirum &
Cash, Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692, 711 (Alaska 1992) ("profits earned by the
breaching party" not awardable unless "shown to correspond in whole or in part to
plaintiffs loss"); National School Studios, Inc. v. Superior School Photo Service, Inc.,
242 P.2d 756, 762-63 (Wash. 1952) (holding that it was not improper for the trial court to
refuse to admit evidence concerning defendant's profits in connection with determination
of plaintiff s damages resulting from breach of covenant not to compete).
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Vermont Electric Supply Co, v. Andrus, 373 A.2d 531, 532 (Vermont 1977). Thus, in
cases where an employer relies solely on the profits allegedly obtained by a breaching exemployee, rather than seek to prove its own lost profits, courts routinely refuse to award
damages.
In Ibarra v. Missouri Poster & Sign Co,, 838 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), for
example, when the employer "had not attempted to calculate the company's monetary
loss" for the breach of a noncompete by an ex-employee and instead relied solely on "the
amount of gross sales made by the [former employee] while employed by [the new
employer]," the court refused to award damages. Id, at 39-40. Likewise, in American Air
Filter Co, v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975), the court rejected damages theories
based on gains of the ex-employee or the new employer because "a defendant's profits
are not the measure of a contract plaintiffs losses." Id. at 1300 & n.8.10
1U

See also D, W, Trowbridge Ford, 262 N.W.2d at 446 ("[T]he measure of
damages, expressed generally, is the value of the business lost to the plaintiff—not the
gain of defendant.") (citation omitted); Lenco Pro v, Guerin, 1998 Mass. App. Div. 10,
11 (1998) ("The damages in [an action for breach of a noncompetition agreement] are
generally calculated as income or profits lost to the former employer. We find no case
where damages in contract for breach of a covenant not to compete have been measured
in any other way.") (internal citation omitted); Axford, 61 S.E.2d at 642 (holding that
"measure of damages recoverable for the breach of a covenant of the seller of a business
not to reengage in the business in competition with the purchaser is the value of the
business lost by plaintiff and not the gain of defendant resulting from his breach of the
covenant"); Dunn, 670 P.2d at 61 ("The measure of damage for the breach of an anticompetition clause is the amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the breach . . . . The
measure of damages is not the amount of profits made by the defendant, rather it is the
amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach."); DBA Enters., Inc, v, Allen,
923 P.2d 298, 302-03 (Colo. App. 1996) (noting that other jurisdictions have held that
damages for the breach of covenant not to compete are measured by lost profits and not
by benefit to ex-employee; refusing to award "gross receipts" of breaching party because
it was an "inappropriate measure" of damages).
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The Robbins analysis—together with the general contract damages rules addressed
in Points 1(A) and (B), above—conforms to this authority from other jurisdictions, and
should be confirmed here by a statement that an employer's damages for an exemployee's breach of a covenant not to compete are the employer's lost profits.
2.

Lost Profits Are the Measure of Damages for Breach of a
Nondisclosure Agreement.

The measure of damages should be no different for an employer's claim for breach
of an employee nondisclosure agreement. While this Court has never addressed this issue
directly, lost profits are the generally recognized measure of damages in such cases in
other jurisdictions.l x
For example, in Rodgard Corp. v. Miner Enters., Inc., Civ. No. 84-CV-0397E(M),
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19403, *18-*20 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1998), rather than "asserting
claims for legal damages (i.e., plaintiffs' lost profits .. .) other than nominal damages,
plaintiffs argued that breach of the confidentiality agreement entitled them to equitable
relief in the form of a constructive trust and accounting for defendants' profits or, in the
11

See, e.g., The Toledo Group, Inc. v. Benton Indus., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 205, 211
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding against plaintiff on breach of confidentiality agreement
claim where plaintiff could not show that "this breach of the confidentiality agreement
caused any loss to [plaintiff]."); Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 210 F.3d
1,7, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming "lost profits" damages for breach of confidentiality
agreement but denying portion of lost profits calculation); Suresource, Inc. v. Sendirect,
LLC, CV044001671S, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 702, *22-*23 (March 14, 2005)
(disallowing damages claim for breach of "confidentiality agreement" that included
noncompetition and nonsolicitation provisions because plaintiff failed to show that
defendant's actions caused "plaintiff to lose that business and suffer damages"); Edix
Media Group, Inc. v. Mahani, Civ. No. 2186-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 207, *51-*57
(Dec. 12, 2006) (noting that plaintiff was entitled to "compensatory damages" arising
from breach of confidentiality agreements and awarding damages based on lost profits
from contracts lost due to defendant's use of confidential information).
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alternative, a reasonable royalty." Id. The court granted summary judgment against the
employer because "defendant's profits" were not recoverable and plaintiff failed to show
"that they are entitled to any damages as a result" of the breach of confidentiality
agreements. Id. at *20, *22.
Based on the general Utah standards for contract damages and the foregoing
authority from other jurisdictions regarding nondisclosure agreements, the Court should
hold that the proper measure of damages for the breach of TruGreen's nondisclosure
agreement is the losses suffered as a result of the breach, and not restitution or unjust
enrichment.
3.

The Employer's Lost Profits Are the Measure of Damages for
Breach of an Employee Nonsolicitation Agreement.

The proper measure of damages for the breach of an employee nonsolicitation
provision is the same as for other breach of contract claims—the expectation interest
measured by the plaintiffs lost profits. This specific contract breach has not been
examined by this Court, but the same general contract remedy should be applied. Other
jurisdictions follow this standard.

12

See e.g., Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, Civ. No. 89-2047-S, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1530, *15 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 1991) (employer entitled to lost profits and "costs
incurred in replacing employees who were enticed away" in violation of employee
nonsolicitation provision); Newsouth Comms. Corp. v. Universal Telephone Co., LLC,
Civ. No. 02-2722, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18969, *70-*71 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2002)
(awarding damages equivalent to profits from customer lost due to solicitation away of
plaintiffs employees in breach of contract); Western Insulation, L.P. v. Moore, Civ. No.
3:05CV602, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 77065, *38-*39 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2006) (awarding
lost profits for breach of noncompetition and employee nonsolicitation agreement but
refusing to award "damages for training new employees" because plaintiff failed to prove
such damages), partially overruled, Nos. 06-2028 and 06-2075, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
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For example, in Nationscredit Corp. v. CSSI, The Support Group, Inc., Civ. No.
05-99-01612-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1313, *16-*20 (Mar. 21, 2002), the court was
faced with the issue of whether a plaintiff could recover "unjust enrichment" damages for
the breach of a nonhire provision where the plaintiff failed to prove it had lost profits due
to the defendant's breach. The court held:
In the present case, the jury found the non-hire provision of the . . .
Agreement was breached, but found no lost profits. Although the jury
awarded damages to [plaintiff] for unjust enrichment, unjust enrichment
was an improper measure of damages for breach of contract because the
non-hire provision in the contract was expressly stated and enforceable.
/</. at*19.
Likewise, in Long Beach Mortgage Co. v. Palazzo, Civ. No. G025646, 2002 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2484, *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2002), the employer attempted to
prove its damages for the breach of a noncompetition provision and an employee
nonsolicitation provision by presenting an expert whose calculation "was nothing more
than the simple application of [the former employer's] profit margin to [the new
employer's] revenues." Id. The court rejected this theory—and excluded the expert—
because there had not been a proper showing of plaintiff s actual "lost profits." Id.
TruGreen should also be limited to its lost profits on its claim for alleged
employee breaches of TruGreen's nonsolicitation agreement. There is no basis in Utah
law to award restitution or unjust enrichment for such alleged breaches.

17713, *13-*26 (4th Cir. July 25, 2007) (noting that "lost profits" are awardable for
breach of contract but reversing trial court's award of lost profits because plaintiff failed
to show that "but for" the defendant's actions the plaintiff would not have suffered these
lost profits).
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II.

THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE IS THE PLAINTIFF'S LOST PROFITS CAUSED BY
THE DEFENDANT'S TORTIOUS CONDUCT.
The Court should answer in the negative the second certified question, whether

Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious interference.
Although this Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether "restitutionary"
damages are recoverable in a tortious interference case, several decisions by this Court
and the Court of Appeals have recognized and applied Section 774A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and have confirmed that a plaintiff is entitled to recover lost profits
from a defendant held liable for tortious interference. Utah courts are not alone. This
same rule has been recognized in most other jurisdictions.
A.

This Court Has Recognized Lost Profits as the Measure of Damages
for a Tortious Interference Claim.

Several decisions by this Court confirm that the proper measure of damages in a
tortious interference case is lost profits. See, e.g., Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assocs.,
Inc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1982) (affirming that the proper measure of damages for
defendant's breach of lease and tortious interference with plaintiffs movie theater
business was plaintiffs "reduction in patronage and revenue"); Globe Leasing Corp. v.
Bank of Salt Lake, 586 P.2d 420, 421-22 (Utah 1978) (reversing the trial court's damages
award of $50,000 because plaintiff could not show it lost $50,000 without evidence that
defendant's direct collection led to lost profits or that plaintiff actually had lost profits in
that amount).

26
SLCJ27638

For example, in Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323,
this Court decided whether a plaintiff had sufficiently established on summary judgment
the damages supporting its tortious interference claim. The plaintiff had entered into a
contract to purchase certain property but the contract was contingent upon plaintiff
obtaining zoning approvals. Id. at \ 2. The defendants, opponents to plaintiffs proposed
use of the property, represented to the seller that either they could raise sufficient funds to
buy the property or there were other potential buyers for the property. Id. at ^f 8. Based
on these representations, the contract for the purchase of the property expired and
plaintiff later bought the property for an inflated amount. Id. at \ 33. This Court held
that the damages for defendants' alleged interference with the plaintiffs economic
relations were limited to those it incurred as a direct result of defendants' wrongful
conduct—i.e., those damages actually attributable to the defendants' actions—namely,
the difference in the purchase price of the property between the time of the first contract
and the time plaintiff actually was able to make the purchase. Id. at \ 34.
These authorities are consistent with this Court's pronouncements regarding tort
law generally, which requires a showing of the fundamental elements of causation and
actual injury. See, e.g., Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1987) ("Under
traditional tort analysis, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, the breach of
which proximately causes injury to the plaintiff."); Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80, \
9, 125 P.3d 906 (noting elements of negligence include "that the breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or
damages.") (citation omitted). Awarding unjust enrichment or restitution for tortious acts
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would not be based on actual injury sustained by the plaintiff as an actual and proximate
result of the defendant's tortious conduct.
Based on these authorities, the Court can readily dispose of the second certified
question and confirm that Utah law does not recognize unjust enrichment or restitution as
the measure of damages for tortious interference, but instead recognizes that a prevailing
plaintiff is entitled to recover any lost profits or other losses attributable to the tortious
interference.
B.

Courts Interpreting Utah Law Have Expressly Held That Damages for
Tortious Interference Are Measured by the Plaintiffs Losses,

Other state and federal courts interpreting Utah law with respect to tortious
interference have held that damages for tortious interference under Utah law are
measured by the actual pecuniary losses suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the tortious
1 O

interference, as provided in Section 774A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

See

Damages recoverable under Section 774A are explained as follows:
Whether the interference is with an existing contract or with a prospective
contractual relation, one who becomes liable for it is liable for damages for
the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the relation. In the case
in which a third person is prevented from performing a contract with the
plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover for the loss of profits from the contract.
When it is the plaintiff himself who is prevented from performance of his
contract with a third person, he may recover for expenses to which he is put
or for other pecuniary losses incurred in making his performance good.
And when the defendant's interference is with prospective contractual
relations, the plaintiff may recover for the loss of profits to be made out of
the expected contracts.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A cmt. B. The drafters of the Restatement
recognized that there may be occasions when it is difficult for a plaintiff to prove its lost
profits. See id. cmt. c. Rather than allow for restitution or unjust enrichment damages in
such circumstances, the drafters note that "when the court is convinced that damages
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Sampson v. Richins, 110 P.2d 998, 1006-07 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirming damages
award under Section 774A, stating that "one who is ultimately deemed liable to another
for interference with economic relations is liable for 'the pecuniary loss of the benefits of
the contract or the prospective relation; [or] consequential losses for which the
interference is a legal cause.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 774A at 55 (1979))); Bosshard v. Wagstaff, Nos. 90-4062, 90-4068, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16112, *5 (10th Cir. July 16, 1991) ("A person charged with interference
with economic relations is potentially liable for the loss of benefits under the contract or
the consequential losses for which the interference is the legal cause.") (interpreting Utah
law); United States v. Bald Eagle Realty, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (D. Utah 1998)
(holding that remedy for tortious interference in Utah is "the pecuniary loss of the
benefits of the contract or the prospective relation [or] consequential damages for which
the interference is a legal cause.").
As correctly explained in Sampson, the trial court's findings regarding damages
"must identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by [plaintiff] as a result of [defendant's
conduct." 770 P.2d at 1006-07. Based on these persuasive authorities, coupled with this
Court's own rulings, the Court should resolve that restitutionary or unjust enrichment
remedies—irrespective of the plaintiffs actual loss—are not the proper measure of
damages for tortious interference.

have been incurred but the amount cannot be proved with reasonable certainty, it awards
nominal damages." Id.
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C.

Other Jurisdictions Expressly Reject Restitution or Unjust Enrichment
Damages as the Proper Measure of Damages for Tortious Interference,

In addition to the many jurisdictions that have adopted Section 774A of the
Restatement and have awarded lost profits in accordance with that section,14 several
jurisdictions have specifically held that damages for tortious interference are measured by

See, e.g., KForce, Inc. v. Surrex Solutions Corp., 436 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir.
2006) (recognizing that Missouri adopted Section 774A and noting that damages for
tortious interference are "the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract"); KWPlastics
v. United States Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (requiring proof of
plaintiffs actual losses under Section 774A); DiLoreto v. Shumake, 38 Cal. App. 4th 35,
38-39 (1995) (citing Section 774A as measure of damages); Innovative Financial
Services, LLC v. Urban, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775 (refusing to award damages for
intentional interference with noncompete agreement where plaintiff "failed to prove its
actual damages" and addressing damages for interference with employment contract
under section 774A); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 982 P.2d 945, 951-52
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (reversing damages award because plaintiff failed to prove "lost
business profits" caused by interference with noncompetition provision); Dowd & Dowd
Ltd .v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754, 771-73 (111. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming award of lost
profits for tortious interference claim); Burk v. Heritage Food Servs. Equip, Inc., 17fl
N.E. 2d 803, 816-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("[T]he measure of damages for wrongfully
inducing a breach of contract is compensation for the loss incurred" and dismissing claim
where plaintiff failed to prove losses due to interference); Rite Aid Corp v. Lake Shore
Investors, All A.2d 735 (Md. Ct. App. 1984) (adopting section 774A and allowing award
of "pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract."); Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d
794, 805-06 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (under section 774A and Restatement of
Contracts (Second) § 347 (cited above)) former employer was entitled to consequential
damages measured by lost profits for interference with an employee noncompete
agreement); Excel Indus. Elecs. v. Blanco, No. 196899, 1998 Mich. App. LEXIS 1824,
*4-*5 (Mich. Ct. App. June 30, 1998) (under section 774A plaintiff had failed to prove
damages where it did not offer "evidence of a loss of net profits"); Developers Three v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1136-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting unjust
enrichment damages, holding that plaintiffs lost profits rather than defendant's gains is
the proper measure of damages) ;C//#ord Mcfarland Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Brier, 1998
R.I. Super LEXIS 68, *29-*30 (limiting damages for tortious interference claim to lost
profits); Lien v. Northwester Engg Co., 39 N.W.2d 483, 485-86 (S.D. 1949) (measure of
damages is net lost profits); Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Dist. Co.,
734 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tenn. 1987) (lost profits must be measured by the loss sustained
by plaintiffs business and not by its effect upon defendant's business).
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the "lost profits the plaintiff business sustained as a result of the tortious interference, not
by its effect upon the defendant's business." UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest
Motor Supply Co., 110 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (affirming award of lost profits
for tortious interference claim).15
For example, in Marcus, Stowel & Beye Govt. Sec.f Inc. v. Jefferson Invest Corp.,
797 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1986), although the plaintiff was awarded its lost profits on both
its breach of contract and tortious interference claims against the defendant, the plaintiff
appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to award
damages based on defendant's profits rather than plaintiffs damages. Id. at 230. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that "the measure of damages for interference with
contractual relations is identical to that for breach of contract" and therefore "the district
court properly limited [plaintiffs] actual damage award to [plaintiffs] loss as a result of
the interference." Id. at 232.
These authorities support previous pronouncements of this Court and other courts
interpreting Utah law, and should be followed here as persuasive authority supporting the
resolution of the second certified question in the negative—that Utah law does not permit

See also American Air Filter Co., 527 F.2d at 1300-01 (rejecting restitution
theory because measure of damages in Pennsylvania and Kentucky for tortious
interference is plaintiffs lost profits as in breach of contract cases); Developers Three v.
Nationwide Insurance Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting
"unjust enrichment" as measure of damages and holding that "correct measure of
damages in this tortious interference action is plaintiffs loss (including lost profits) that
arises out of the tortious interference").
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unjust enrichment as a remedy for tortious interference, but instead requires a showing of
lost profits or other damages actually caused by the tortious interference.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request that the Court resolve
the certified questions in the Order of Acceptance as follows:
First, Utah law does not permit an employer claiming damages to recover an
award of "restitution or unjust enrichment damages" for breach of provisions of
employment contracts, but instead limits the employer's recover against the former
employee to lost profits and other damages resulting from the employee's breach.
Second, Utah law does not recognize an "unjust enrichment measure of damages"
for tortious interference; rather, a plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages, including
lost profits, actually and proximately caused by the defendant's tortious conduct.
DATED this ^ ^ day of November, 2007.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

By:

f^laJjX . //\y^o\^

Richard M. Hymas
J. Mark Gibb
Erik A. Olson
Jason R. Hull

Attorneys for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

o day of November, 2007,1 caused two true and

correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to be served on the
following by hand-delivery:
Brian C. Johnson
William B. Ingram
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

IN THE £H!8UfcWE.#pURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AUG 1 ^ 2007

—x
TruGreen Companies, a Delaware—
limited liabilit^^p^^^j[?R^
Trugreen Limited Partnership,
a Delaware limited partnership,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

Case No. 20070451-SC
No. 1:06CV00024 PGC

Mower Brothers, Inc., a Utah
corporation, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

ORDER OF ACCEPTANCE
This matter is before the court upon the Certification of
Question of State Law to this court by the United States District
Court for the District fo Utah.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Utah Supreme Court accepts the
following questions certified to it:
1.

Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to
an award of lost profits damages, or instead an award
of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a
former employee has breached contractual noncompetition, non-disclosure, and employee nonsolicitation provisions?

2.

Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment
measure of damages for tortious interference with a
competitor's and economic relations?

The certifying court has not filed any portion of the record
in the matter with the Supreme Court. Within fourteen days of
the date of this order, counsel for the parties shall advise this
court as to what portions of the record they believe necessary
for consideration of.the certified questions.
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Following the expiration of the fourteen days, this court
will request those portions of the record from the United States
District Court and provide notice to the parties as to a briefing
schedule.

FOR THE COURT:

Date

/i

/

C h r i s t i n e M. Durham,
Chief J u s t i c e
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L.L.C., a
Delaware limited liability company, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER CERTIFYING
QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT

v.
MOWER BROTHERS, INC., a Utah
corporation, et al.,
Case No. 1:06CV00024 PGC
Defendants.

The impetus for this certification is a dispute over the proper measure of damages for the
breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with contractual and economic
relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act. Plaintiffs TruGreen Companies,
L.L.C., and TruGreen Limited Partnership ("TruGreen") assert claims against four former
TruGreen employees, Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, James LeBlanc, and David Stephensen
("employee defendants"), along with their current employer, Mower Brothers, Inc., and two
directors of Mower Brothers, Jean Babilis and Kevin Bitton. First, TruGreen alleges that the
employee defendants have breached three provisions of the TruGreen employment agreements: a
non-competition provision, a non-disclosure provision, and an employee non-solicitation
provision. Second, TruGreen asserts that Mower Brothers, Bitton, Babilis, and some of the
employee defendants tortiously interfered with TruGreen's economic and contractual

Case 1:06-cv-00024-PGC

Document 287

Filed 06/08/2007

Page 2 of 10

relationships. Third, TruGreen alleges that Mower Brothers, Bitton, and Babilis violated Utah's
Unfair Competition Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103. Defendants deny these claims in all
respects.
With regard to potential damages in this case, TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment
or restitution measure of damages is appropriate for all of its claims. The measure of damages
under an unjust enrichment theory is generally the amount of defendant's profits. Defendants
argue that the appropriate measure of damages is lost profits, which is the amount of profit lost to
the plaintiff because of the breach, interference, or unfair competition. The Court has determined
that there appears to be no controlling Utah law addressing these damages issues.
Consequently, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United
States District Court for the District of Utah certifies to the Utah Supreme Court these questions
of law, which are controlling in the above-captioned matter now pending before this Court:
1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost profits
damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a former
employee has breached contractual non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee nonsolicitation provisions?
2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious
interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations?

2
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3. Whether "actual damages" under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i), the Utah
Unfair Competition Act, means the plaintiffs lost profits or an award of damages defined by the
defendant' s revenues?
To provide some context to the three certified questions, some brief discussion is in
order. The parties disagree over the appropriate theory of damages to be applied in this case.
TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment or restitution measure of damages is appropriate for
all of its claims, while the Defendants argue that the appropriate measure of damages is lost
profits. This Court will briefly address the parties' arguments as they relate to the various causes
of action to clarify the scope of the three certified questions.
1. Breach of Contract Claims
TruGreen seeks restitutionary damages against the employee defendants for their alleged
breach of the non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-solicitation provisions in the
employee contracts. The Defendants contend that any possible damages are limited to
TruGreen's own net lost profits proximately caused by specific breaches by each particular
defendant. The Defendants point out that the majority of state courts that have addressed this
issue appear to limit damages to the employer's lost profits or other consequential losses.1 The

1

See, e.g., Am. Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975) (limiting
damages to lost profits when addressing a breach of a non-competition agreement); The Toledo
Group, Inc. v. Benton Indus., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (applying a lost
profits measure of damages to breach of non-disclosure agreement); Nationscredit Corp. v. CSSI,
The Support Group, Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1313 (Tex. App. Mar. 21, 2002) (noting that
unjust enrichment is not a proper measure of damages for breach of a non-solicitation
agreement).

3
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Defendants assert that these courts have chosen to limit damages in this way by applying general
contract principles recognized in Utah - such as the principle that a non-breaching party is
entitled to recover its "expectation interest," which involves placing the non-breaching party in as
good a position as if the contract were performed.2 The Defendants also cite the Utah principle
that "a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to
an action for damages where there has been a material breach of the contract by the other party."3
Additionally, Defendants argue that the Utah Supreme Court uses the terms "restitution" and
"unjust enrichment" interchangeably to describe the equitable remedy that involves restoring to a
plaintiff the benefit it provided to a party that is not subject to an express contract.4 A court's
application of such principles to the contract claims in this case, in the view of the Defendants,
strongly supports a lost profits theory of recovery.
TruGreen responds that it is not limited to recovering its lost profits but also any unjust
enrichment by the Defendants. TruGreen first notes the difficulty of using a lost profits measure
of damages in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference cases. In System
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, the Utah Supreme Court held that injunctive relief may be an
appropriate remedy for the breach of a non-competition agreement given that "the damages that
may result from the misappropriation of confidential information and goodwill 'could be

2

See, e.g., Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982).

3

Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979).

4

See Am. Towers Owners Ass n v. CCIMeck, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Utah 1996).
4
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estimated only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard."'5 TruGreen then notes that the
Utah Supreme Court has generally acknowledged that an injured employer may also maintain a
claim for damages in addition to seeking injunctive relief.6 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme
Court has shown a willingness to honor liquidated damage provisions in a non-competition
agreement, provided the liquidated amount is reasonable, given that u [t]here is no doubt that the
harm caused by the breach was one that was difficult to estimate with much accuracy."7
In addition to the difficulty of using a lost profits measure of damages for breach of noncompetition cases, TruGreen also recounts the deterrent effect of applying an unjust enrichment
theory of damages. In National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that an employee who breached a non-competition agreement and the competitor who
induced the breach were liable to account for their gains associated with the breach.8 Leyden
noted that "an intending tortfeasor should not be prompted to speculate that his profits might
exceed the injured party's losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort."9 According to
TruGreen, the deterrent effect resulting from restitutionary damages, coupled with the difficulty
of using a lost profits measure in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-

5

669 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1983) (quoting Columbia Coll of Music & Sch. of Dramatic
Art v. Thunberg, 116 P. 280, 282 (Wash. 1911).
6

See Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Dixon, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992).

7

Robbins, 45 P.2d at 626.

8

348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976).

9

M a t 775-76.

5
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interferences cases, are more than sufficient grounds to support restitutionary damages for the
contractual provisions at issue in this case.
While both parties strongly argue their respective positions, they both concede that no
Utah court has expressly determined the proper measure of damages for breach of these specific
contract provisions. Consequently, this Court respectfully asks the Utah Supreme Court to
answer the first certified question.
2. Tortious Interference with Economic and Contractual Relations
The second certified question is whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure
of damages for tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations.
Both parties acknowledge that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted Section 774A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the measure of damages for tortious interference with
contract. Section 774A provides that
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective
contractual relation is liable for damages for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective
relation;
(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to
be expected to result from the interference.10
Despite their respective reliance on Section 774A, the parties disagree regarding the effect of the
Utah Court of Appeal's adoption of this section.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979).
6
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The Defendants argue that Sampson v. Richins is fully instructive on this issue.11 In
Sampson, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed cross-appeals on the amount of damages awarded
to defendants for Sampson's intentional interference with defendants' economic relations.12
Sampson upheld the trial court's damages award pursuant to Section 774A, noting that "one who
is ultimately deemed liable to another for interference with economic relations is liable for 'the
pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective relation; [or] consequential losses
for which the interference is a legal cause . . . ."13 Applying Section 774A, Sampson held that the
trial court's findings regarding damages "must identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by
[plaintiff] as a result of [defendant's conduct."14 In addition to their reliance on Sampson,
Defendants point to numerous courts outside of Utah that recognize that plaintiffs lost profits,
and not restitution of defendant's revenues, are the proper measure of damages for tortious
interference.15
Although TruGreen concedes that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted
Section 774 A, it maintains that such an adoption nevertheless allows for the application of unjust

11

770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

12

M a t 999-1002.

13

Id. at 1006-07 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979)).

14

Id.

15

See, e.g., Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sees., Inc. v. Jefferson Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d
227, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding under Texas law that damages for tortious interference are
measured by plaintiffs lost profits).

7
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enrichment damages in some tortious interference cases. First, TruGreen cites comment c of
Section 774A, where the commentators note that "[a] major problem with damages of this sort is
whether they can be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty."16 Second, TruGreen argues
that the fact Utah courts have adopted Section 774A merely supports the idea that the measure of
damages in tortious interference cases must mirror the measure of damages for the underlying
breach. In Storage Technology Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Eighth Circuit cited Section
774A but subsequently found that under Minnesota law, "[a]n employee who breaches a
noncompetition or nondisclosure covenant can be required to account for his profits."17 The
court reasoned that "where the interference alleged is inducement of breach of restrictive
covenants or fiduciary duties, the remedy should mirror the restitutionary remedy available for
the breach of the covenant or fiduciary duty."18 Also, as was discussed above, TruGreen
contends that a lost profit measure of damages would encourage competitors and employees to
speculate that their gains will outweigh losses and thereby encourage the breach of valid and
enforceable covenants.19
As far as the Court and the parties can assess, no Utah court has directly addressed the
measure of damages where former employees and a competitor tortiously interfere in the context

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A cmt. c (1979).
395 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id.
See Nat'I Merck Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976).
8
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of an employment contract containing non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference
provisions. To determine whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for
tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations, this Court
respectfully requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the second certified question.
3. Unfair Competition
TruGreen has asserted a claim under Utah's Unfair Competition Act, which limits
recovery to "actual damages."20 The parties differ over whether this phrases extends to lost
profits or an award of damages defined by the defendant's revenues. It appears that no Utah
court has interpreted the meaning of "actual damages" under this statute. Consequently, this
Court respectfully aks that the Utah Supreme Court answer the third certified question.
CONCLUSION
The Court has concluded that there is no controlling case law addressing the three
questions of law discussed above. Because these questions of law are controlling in this case,
this Court certifies these questions to your Court. The clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of
this Order of Certification to counsel for all parties to the proceedings in this Court. The clerk
shall also submit to the Utah Supreme Court a certified copy of this Order and any other portion
of the record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme Court. Under Rule
41 (f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court orders that each party shall bear its
own fees and costs of this certification.

20

Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i).
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SO ORDERED.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Paul G. C^ssell
United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L.L.C., a
Delaware limited liability company, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTTS LAWN SERVICE, et al.,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE EXPERT REPORT, AND
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Case No. 1:06CV00024

Both parties in this case have moved for summary judgment on whether defendants are
liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations,
intentional interference with economic relations, and unfair competition. On the record that has
been developed, this case is not amenable to complete resolution on summary judgment.
Numerous material facts dealing with the primary players in this action remain disputed, and,
barring settlement, will have to be resolved at trial. Nevertheless, the court finds that a few
claims are ripe for resolution.
First, the court finds that defendants Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard Coffman, Alfreda
Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker
(the "New Utah Employees") are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claims against
them for both breach of contract and intentional interference with existing and prospective
economic relations. This conclusion is warranted if not for the sole reason that TruGreen elected

not to address these defendants' claims in its opposition and other memoranda. However, even if
TruGreen had addressed these issues, the plain language of the employee contracts and the lack
of evidence showing contact between these employees and former or current TruGreen
employees and customers supports summary judgment in the defendants' favor. Being that these
are the only two claims asserted against the New Utah Employees, the court eliminates these
defendants from the case.
Second, the court finds that all of the remaining employee defendants - Ryan Mantz, Lary
Gaythwaite, Jim LeBlanc, David Stephensen, Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield,
David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr - are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claims
of intentional interference with existing and prospective economic relations. There is little direct
evidence of actual post-employment contact between these Scotts employees and current or
former customers of TruGreen, and even when contact or possible diversion was shown, no
reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence supplied that any contact or diversion by these
defendants was done with an improper purpose or by improper means, as required by both Utah
and Idaho law.
Third, with respect to TruGreen's contract claims, the court finds the following: (1)
Mantz and Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment on Trugreen's claim for breach of the
non-competition provision because even if these defendants' most recent non-compete
agreements are enforceable under Utah law, neither provision prohibits post-employment
competition; (2) LeBlanc, Stephensen, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to
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summary judgment on the claim for breach of the non-interference provision because there is no
evidence that these defendants induced or encouraged TruGreen employees to leave TruGreen;
and (3) Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and
Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation
provision because there is no evidence that they solicited or contacted TruGreen customers with
whom they had actual contact while employed by TruGreen.
Also before the court is Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and evidence of
damages (#202). The court finds that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this case are not sufficiently
reliable to survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the
court GRANTS Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report (#202) and will preclude
testimony from Mr. Elggren at trial.
Because the court denies TruGreen's summary judgment motion without having to strike
any of the challenged facts or testimony, the court finds the following motions by Scotts to be
MOOT, unless specifically addressed in the decision below: motion to strike affidavit and
deposition testimony supporting TruGreen's motion for summary judgment (#217); motion to
strike portions of affidavit of Adam Close and deposition testimony of Bradley Roach (#228);
motion to strike evidence relied on by TruGreen in its summary judgment reply memorandum
(#245).
As explained above and outlined in more detail below, the court GRANTS in part and
DENIES in part Scotts' motion for summary judgment (#175; #181; #183; #185; #187) and
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GRANTS Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and evidence of damages (#202).
The court DENIES TruGreen's motions for summary judgment (#151 and #177).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1 Rather than recite the entire backdrop of this case,
the court briefly recites the facts relevant to this order. For the purpose of resolving these
competing motions for summary judgment, the court finds the following facts.
General Background
Trugreen is a lawn care company with offices throughout the United States. It is the
nation's largest provider of residential lawn care and undertakes substantial marketing and sales
efforts to establish and maintain its customer base. Employing many full-time individuals,
TruGreen utilizes sales representatives who are responsible for selling TruGreen programs and
services, compiling lists of prospective customers, engaging in person-to-person contacts by
telephone and neighborhood marketing efforts, and following up with customer inquiry leads.
The branch marketing managers at TruGreen plan, direct, and coordinate marketing and sales
efforts and the branch managers have general oversight and control of a branch office. TruGreen
asserts that each employee receives an extensive and consistent regiment of specialized and
confidential training, but defendants maintain that the training of the named employees in this

1

Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2006).
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action was minimal. Trugreen requires its employees to sign confidentiality and non-competition
contracts as a condition of their employment.
The current dispute arose when Ryan Mantz, a former branch manager of Trugreen's
Ogden branch, voluntarily resigned from Trugreen on or about November 1, 2005. Within weeks
of leaving, Mantz began working for Scotts in Ogden, Utah, one of Trugreen's direct
competitors. Mantz allegedly began recruiting other Trugreen employees to join him at Scotts.
From November 2005 to the present, a number of TruGreen employees have left to work for
Scotts. The following groups of defendants are all former TruGreen employees that worked for
Scotts after leaving TruGreen.
The "New Utah Employees"
Jason Beck, Paul Brower, Richard Coffman, Alfreda Egbert, Margie Smith, Jessica
Spencer, Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker are all former employees of
TruGreen that have recently worked for Scotts. Each of these employees began working for
TruGreen at various times, one starting as early as 1996, and they all left TruGreen in either 2005
or 2006. During their employment with TruGreen, employees Beck, Brower, Coffman, Egbert,
Smith, and Spencer, respectively, all signed one and only one, non-compete agreement in favor
of TruGreen. Each of the agreements signed by these employees contained a non-competition
provision that reads:
During Employee's employment with TruGreen, the Employee shall not, without the
express written approval of TruGreen's President, Chief Operating Officer, or
General Counsel, directly or indirectly, own, manage, participate in or otherwise
engage or have any connection with any business which provides any service or
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product that, to the Employee's knowledge, is provided or proposed to be provided
by TruGreen.
In addition to this non-competition provision, each of the agreements contained provisions
covering the solicitation of TruGreen customers, interference with TruGreen employees, and the
disclosure of confidential information. The non-solicitation provision reads:
(b) Non-solicitation. During Employee's employment with TruGreen and for a
period of one (1) year following the termination of such [employment],... Employee
will not, . . . directly or indirectly, on behalf of himself or others, solicit in any
manner (with the intent of directly or indirectly providing any service or product
competitive with the service or product which is provided by TruGreen . . . ) any
TruGreen customer with whom Employee had actual contact with while employed
by TruGreen.
The agreements also contain a non-interference provision:
(c) Non-interference. Employee shall not directly or indirectly induce or encourage
(i) any TruGreen employee or contractor to leave his/her position or to seek
employment or association with any person or entity other than TruGreen . . . .
Each of the agreements also contain provisions regarding confidential information:
The parties agree that Employee is or is about to be employed by TruGreen in a
capacity which may permit Employee to have access to confidential information not
generally known to the public, including Trade Secrets, in which TruGreen has
invested substantial time, money and effort in developing and thus has a valuable
property interest in, including but not limited to, marketing and sales techniques,
product and equipment information, financial data, billing rates, formulas, methods,
theories, manuals, customer expectations and customer data (collectively
"Confidential Information"). A 'Trade Secret" is any information (whether or not
written or stored in any medium) that derives independent economic value from not
being generally known to, or being readily ascertainable through proper means, by
the public . . . .

4. Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure
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(a) Non-Disclosure of Confidential Information. Employee acknowledges
that during the course of performing Employee's duties hereunder, Employee will
have access, and has heretofore had access, to TruGreen's Confidential Information.
Employee, while in TruGreen's employ or at any time thereafter, will n o t . . . directly
or indirectly communicate or divulge, or use for Employee's own benefit or for the
benefit of any other person or entity, any Confidential Information which Employee
acquired during the course of Employee's employment with TruGreen . . . .
(b) Return of Information. Promptly after the termination of Employee's
employment with TruGreen or upon TruGreen's request at any time (whichever
occurs earlier), Employee will deliver to TruGreen all business related documents
including, but not limited to, originals and copies of memoranda, customer lists,
materials relating to procedures, samples, records, documents, contracts, formulas,
computer programs, product information and any other Confidential Information
which Employee has obtained while employed by TruGreen.
Shannon Christensen, James Murray, and Matt Walker are also former employees of
TruGreen that subsequently worked for Scotts. Unlike the New Utah Employees discussed in the
preceding paragraph, these employees all signed at least two non-competition agreements.
Murray signed a confidentiality agreement with TruGreen on March 21, 2001, in which
he agreed not to take certain materials with him when he left TruGreen or to encourage other
employees to terminate their relationships with TruGreen. On January 13, 2003, Murray signed
an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement with Trugreen which stated that while he
was employed with TruGreen he would not work for any other company that was in competition
with TruGreen. The contract also contained non-solicitation and non-interference provisions,
which applied for a year following Murray's employment. On March 22, 2004, Murray signed
the same contract again.
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Christensen signed an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement on May 5, 2000,
in which she agreed that for six months following her termination with TruGreen she would not
work for a company within the same geographic region that was in direct competition with
TruGreen. The May 5 contract also contemplated non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and
confidentiality provisions. Christensen later signed another employment agreement, at the
request of TruGreen. This contract also included non-disclosure, non-compete, and nonsolicitation provisions. Notably, however, this second contract stated that Christensen's noncompetition agreement was only valid while she was employed with TruGreen.
On January 4, 1999, Walker signed an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement
in which he agreed that for six months following his termination with TruGreen he would not
work for a company within the same geographic region that was in direct competition with
TruGreen. The January 4 contract also contemplated non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and
confidentiality provisions. On October 23, 2003, Walker signed another employment agreement,
at the request of TruGreen. This contract also included non-disclosure, non-compete, and nonsolicitation provisions. Notably, however, this second contract stated that Walker's noncompetition agreement was only valid while he was employed with TruGreen.
Murray, Walker, and Christensen, after starting their new employment at Scotts and
between February 2005 and May 2006, each received a letter from TruGreen reminding them of
the employment contract they had signed with TruGreen. Each of the three letters referenced
only the most recent contract signed by the former employees and specifically mentioned the
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confidential information and solicitation provisions of that contract. Copies of the most recent
agreements signed by these employees were sent as attachments to the letter.
The New Utah Employees did not take any documents or information belonging to
TruGreen when they left and have not disclosed any TruGreen documents or materials belonging
to TruGreen. None of the employees remember any specific customer, financial, sales,
marketing, training, or other information that they may have seen or heard while employed by
TruGreen, and they have not used or disclosed any such information while working for Scotts.
Since going to work for Scotts, these employees have not contacted anyone they know to be a
TruGreen customer for the purpose of soliciting business. Also, the New Utah Employees have
not induced or encouraged any TruGreen employee to leave TruGreen or go to work for Scotts.
Lastly, these employees have not encouraged any current or former TruGreen employee to violate
the terms of any agreement that they have with TruGreen.
The "Utah Employees"
Ryan Mantz started working for TruGreen in 1993 and has worked for TruGreen in
various positions and in various geographic areas for over twelve years. He spent his last years
of employment with TruGreen working as the Ogden Branch Manager. In October 2005, Mantz
left TruGreen and started working for Scotts as the branch manager of Scott's Salt Lake City
franchise, and is also recognized to be the regional marketing manager.
While employed at TruGreen, Mantz entered into at least two non-compete agreements.
The first agreement, signed on April 19, 1993, includes a non-competition provision that reads:
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During the six month period immediately following the termination of my
employment with TruGreen, I will not, within any geographic area in which I was
assigned duties during the last six months of my employment with TruGreen, directly
or indirectly become interested in (as an individual, partner, stockholder, director,
officer, principal, agent, employee, trustee, lender of money or in any other relation
or capacity whatsoever) any business which renders services that compete with
services provided by TruGreen.
Mantz signed another non-compete agreement in favor of TruGreen in 2003. This New
Agreement contained the same non-competition provision as the agreements signed by the New
Utah Employees. Namely, it only prohibited Mantz from competing with TruGreen during his
employment with TruGreen. Mantz's 2003 Agreement also included the same non-solicitation,
non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions contained in the agreements signed by the New
Utah Employees.
In January 2006, Mantz received a letter from TruGreen's attorney, Carol Pearson, which
requests that Mantz comply with the terms of the agreement that he signed with TruGreen.
Pearson attached a copy of the 2003 Agreement to the January letter. Mantz continued to work
for Scotts after receiving this letter.
Mantz, in affidavit and deposition testimony, stated that since he began working for
Scotts, he has not contacted any person known to him to be a TruGreen customer for the purpose
of soliciting the person's business for Scotts. He also testified that he has not encouraged or
caused any named employee to contact TruGreen's customers to solicit their business for Scotts.
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Lary Gaythwaite was hired by TruGreen in 1998 as a sales representative in its Boise
Branch. Between December 1999 and November 2005, Gaythwaite held a number of job titles
with TruGreen, working in branch offices in both Utah and Idaho. In November 2005,
Gaythwaite left TruGreen and accepted a position with Scotts as its Salt Lake City Branch
Marketing Manager.
Dave Stephensen and Jim LeBlanc were hired by TruGreen in 1994 and 2001,
respectively. Both were hired as sales representatives, with Stephensen starting his work in
TruGreen's Ogden office and LeBlanc working in the Boise branch. Stephensen worked for
TruGreen between 1994 and 1997, and thereafter, from 2000 until January 2006. LeBlanc
worked for TruGreen from 2001 until January 2005. Both Stephensen and LeBlanc left
TruGreen in January 2006, and soon thereafter, started working for Scotts in its Ogden and Salt
Lake City franchises, respectively.
During their employment with Scotts, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen each signed
at least two one non-competition agreement in favor of TruGreen. These agreements contain
non-solicitation, non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions that are very similar to the ones
contained in the agreements signed by Mantz and the New Utah Employees. However, the noncompetition provision in Gaythwaite's most recent agreement, signed in 2004, states that
Gaythwaite may not compete with TruGreen for one year following his employment with
TruGreen in any geographic area in which he was assigned duties during the last six months of
his employment with TruGreen. Also, the non-competition provision contained in the agreement
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signed by LeBlanc in 2002, states that LeBlanc may not compete with TruGreen for six months
following his employment with TruGreen in any geographic area in which he was assigned duties
during the last six months that he was employed by TruGreen.
LeBlanc spent at least the last six months of his employment with TruGreen working at
its Ogden branch in Clearfield, Utah. After leaving TruGreen, LeBlanc began working for Scotts
in its Salt Lake branch. Gaythwaite also spent the last six months of his employment in
TruGreen's Ogden office, and after leaving, worked for Scotts in its Salt Lake branch office in
Murray, Utah. There is some testimony stating that Gaythwaite prepared budgets in Salt Lake
City during his last six months of employment with TruGreen, and there is testimony that
LeBlanc made collection calls out of Salt Lake City during the last six months of his employment
at TruGreen.
Stephensen signed an employee confidentiality/non-compete agreement on November 30,
2000, in which he agreed that for the six month period following his termination with TruGreen,
he would not work for a company within the same geographic region that was in direct
competition with TruGreen. Stephensen later signed another employment agreement at the
request of TruGreen on January 2, 2003. This contract also included non-disclosure, noncompete, and non-solicitation provisions. Notably, however, this second contract stated that
Stephensen's non-competition agreement was only valid while he was employed with TruGreen.
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In January 2006, after they began working for Scotts, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and
Stephensen all received letters from TruGreen. Signed by TruGreen's attorney, the letters
demand that Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen abide by the non-compete, non-disclosure,
and non-solicitation provisions in their contracts. Enclosed with Pearson's letter to Gaythwaite
was his 2004 Agreement; enclosed with Pearson's letter to LeBlanc was the 2002 Agreement;
and attached to Stephensen's letter was a copy of his 2003 Agreement.
The "Idaho Employees"
In April 2002, TruGreen hired Jason Hiller to work as an aerator in Boise, Idaho. Three
months later, Hiller became a TruGreen telemarketer in the Boise Office, and from August 2002
to February 2004, Hiller worked as a salesman in the Boise office. From February 2004 to
March 2005, Hiller spent time working for TruGreen or its affiliate as a marketing manager in
Ogden, Utah, and Twin Falls, Idaho. For the last nine months that Hiller worked at Trugreen,
March 2005 to November 2005, Hiller was a co-marketing manager in the Boise office. Hiller
admits to receiving training from TruGreen, but denies that this training was specialized or
unique. He also admits to watching two training DVDs. As the marketing manager, Hiller was
exposed to customer lists and neighborhood lists used by TruGreen. During his employment at
TruGreen, Hiller signed at least two non-compete agreements, the most recent one dated
November 5, 2003. This agreement included a non-competition provision that reads:
During the one (1) year period following termination of Employee's employment
with TruGreen, Employee will not, within any geographic area in which Employee
was assigned duties during the last six (6) months of employment, directly or
indirectly becomes interested in (as an individual, partner, stockholder, director,
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officer, principal, agent, employee, trustee, lender of money or in any other capacity)
any work or activity that involves a product, process, service or development which
is then competitive with a product, process, service, or development which is
regularly used or planned to be used in the operation of TruGreen's business.
Like the agreements signed by the Utah Employees, the agreements signed by the Idaho
Employees also contained the non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and non-interference provisions.
Hiller left TruGreen in November 2005 because, among other things, he believed the
sales representatives he supervised were overworked and underpaid. When Hiller resigned, he
had a brief conversation with Mitch Smith, in which Smith told Hiller: "You know, I don't care
if you compete. I just ask you that you not harm my business directly." Soon after leaving
TruGreen, Hiller started working for Scotts in Boise, Idaho.
TruGreen hired Clogston, Deerfield, and Van Acker, in 2003, 2004, and 2005,
respectively, as sales representatives at its Boise office. During the fall and winter, these
salesmen made telephone sales calls using computer-generated information about prospective
customers. During the spring and summer, they would be handed printed leads generated by
TruGreen and they would visit each prospective customer, perform a lawn analysis, and leave the
filled-out lawn analysis form for the customer. These employees had daily sales meetings where
they discussed various statistical information.
Tammy Roehr was hired by TruGreen in July 2001, to work as an auditor in TruGreen's
Boise office. In this position, Roehr called people who had placed orders with TruGreen,
verified that they had ordered the services shown on the sales sheet, and entered sales
information into the computer. She claims that she received little training when she began her
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work as an auditor. When she started her work as an auditor, she was given a script to use in
making calls, and was trained on how to enter sales in to the computer system.
Roehr worked as a commercial administrator in the Boise office from June 2003 to
November 2005. Working in this capacity, Roehr scheduled appointments with TruGreen's
commercial customers, sent out invoices, and set up and maintained a filing system for customer
contracts.
Each of these employees signed essentially identical non-competition agreements, all of
which contained the same non-competition provision quoted above from Hiller's agreement, and
the same non-solicitation, non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions included in the Utah
Employees' agreements. Within six months of leaving TruGreen, each of these employees began
working for Scotts in the same geographic area where they worked for TruGreen, namely, Boise,
Idaho.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."2 Courts may appropriately grant summary judgment "if there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."3 When a
2

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c).

3

Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317,322(1986)).
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case involves cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 4"construe[s] all inferences in
favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.'" 4
DISCUSSION
The court must determine whether the former employees breached their contracts with
TruGreen and whether these former employees and their new employers tortiously interfered
with TruGreen's contractual and/or economic relations. In addressing a motion for a preliminary
injunction in this case, the court suggested that the case might possibly be one that could be
disposed of on summary judgment in favor of TruGreen. Having reserved judgment until the
issues were fully briefed, the court concludes that this initial assessment has not turned out to be
true. Material issues of fact remain as to the primary players and many of the claims, so
TruGreen's case must go to trial. Nevertheless, the court is prepared to now grant summary
judgment for Scotts on three specific claims.
First, the court finds that the New Utah Employees are entitled to summary judgment on
TruGreen's claims against them for both breach of contract and intentional interference with
existing and prospective economic relations. Second, the court finds that all of the remaining
employee defendants are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claims of intentional
interference with existing and prospective economic relations. Third, with respect to TruGreen's
contract claims, the court finds that (1) Mantz and Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment

4

Am. Inv. Fin. v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1323 (D. Utah 2005) (quoting
Pirkheim v. First UNUMLife Ins., 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000)).
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on Trugreen's claim for breach of the non-competition provision, (2) LeBlanc, Stephensen,
Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on the claim for
breach of the non-interference provision, and (3) Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen,
Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on
TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation provision.
Also before the court is Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and evidence on
damages. Although the court finds that Mr. Elggren is qualified to offer an expert opinion in this
case, the court finds that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this case are not sufficiently reliable to
survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The court will first address the three issues on which Scotts' is entitled to summary
judgment and will then briefly address the claims for which summary judgment is not
appropriate. Following this discussion, the court will address the issue of damages.
I. CLAIMS AGAINST THE NEW UTAH EMPLOYEES
The New Utah Employees, consisting of Spencer, Smith, Egbert, Brower, Coffman, Beck,
Murray, and Christensen, are entitled to summary judgment on both of TruGreen's claims against
them because: (1) their respective agreements do not prohibit them from competing against
TruGreen after ending their employment, (2) TruGreen has failed to produce evidence that these
employees breached any of the other clauses in their agreements, and (3) TruGreen has failed not
only to demonstrate that the New Utah Employees had any contact with current or former
TruGreen customers after starting their work with Scotts, but also that they diverted work from
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TruGreen to Scotts with an improper purpose or by improper means. The court will first address
the New Utah Employees's motion for summary judgment on the contract claims and then
proceed to discuss the tortious interference with economic relations claims.
A. Breach of Contract Claims Against New Utah Employees
Because some of the New Utah Employees had signed multiple agreements, the court will
address these employees separately from those that signed only one agreement.
1. Claims against Spencer, Smith, Egbert, Brower, Coffman, and Beck
Spencer, Smith, Egbert, Brower, Coffman, and Beck, respectively, all signed one
agreement while employed with TruGreen. Like most of the other agreements at issue in this
case, the agreements signed by these defendants contained provisions regarding confidentiality,
solicitation, interference, and competition. As noted above, each of these agreements contained a
non-competition provision that restricted the employees from competing with TruGreen only
during their employment with TruGreen. Specifically, the provision reads:
During Employee's employment with TruGreen, the Employee shall not, without the
express written approval of TruGreen's President, Chief Operating Officer, or
General Counsel, directly or indirectly, own, manage, participate in or otherwise
engage or have any connection with any business which provides any service or
product that, to the Employee's knowledge, is provided or proposed to be provided
by TruGreen.
Because this provision only prohibits its signer from competing with TruGreen during the
employment, TruGreen cannot successfully assert breach of contract based on their subsequent
employment with Scotts. Although the agreements signed by these employees also contained the
non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and non-interference provisions that extended beyond the time
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of their employment, TruGreen has failed to produce evidence of a disputed material fact as to
whether these defendants breached any of these other provisions. Moreover, Smith, Spencer,
Egbert, Brower, Coffman, and Beck produced affidavits refuting any allegations that they
breached the respective provisions of their agreements with TruGreen. Based on this undisputed
evidence, the court concludes that no reasonable juror could find that these defendants breached
their agreements.
2. Contract Claims against Christensen, Murray, and Walker
During their employment at TruGreen, Murray signed three competition and non-compete
agreements, Christensen signed two competition and non-compete agreements, and Walker
signed at least two agreements. The court finds that the most recent agreements signed by these
defendants supercede their prior agreements because the new agreements appear to fully cover
the subject areas addressed in the old agreements.
Under Utah law, a subsequent contract replaces the terms of a prior contract when (1)
there is an existing valid contract; (2) all parties agreed to a new contract; (3) the new contract
extinguishes the prior contract; and, (4) the new contract is valid.5 In order for a contract to be
merged into another, it must be "plainly shown that such was the intent of the parties; and this is
usually where the later contract fully covers an earlier one . . . ."6 Citing Idaho law, defendants
provide additional insights as to when a subsequent agreement completely supplants a prior one,
5

Ford v. Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15, 22 (Utah 2004); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 279 (1981).
6

Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).
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noting that the new contract must either explicitly rescind the earlier contract, deal with the
subject matter of the former contract so comprehensively as to be complete within itself and to
raise the legal inference of substitution, or present such inconsistencies with the first contract that
the two cannot in any substantial respect stand together.7
The most recent agreements signed by Christensen, Murray, and Walker, not only appear
to fully cover their respective earlier agreements, but the new agreements appear to be at odds
with the earlier agreements, specifically with regard to the six-month covenant not to compete,
which is contained in the earlier agreements. TruGreen contends that the new agreements do not
fully cover the previous agreements because the "modified non-compete Agreements contain no
provision or references whatsoever to a post-termination covenant that would supercede or
extinguish the prior six-month covenants."8 The court is unpersuaded by this argument. Both
the old and new agreements contained non-competition provisions, the primary difference being
that the new agreements only prohibited competition during the time the defendants were
employed at TruGreen. Put another way, the new agreement covered the exact same subject
matter (non-competition) with a variation on the time involved.
If there were any doubt on this issue, the letters from TruGreen's legal counsel resolve
them. The letters remind their recipients that they signed a non-competition agreement while
working at TruGreen, and attached to the letter, were copies of the new agreements, and only the

7

Silver Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunshine Min. Co., 611 P.2d 1011, 1020 (Idaho 1979).

8

Def.'s Mem. Opp. Summ. J. 26.
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new agreements, signed by these defendants. While these letters arguably estop TruGreen from
contending that two separate agreements exist, the simpler route to the same destination is to
simply treat these letters as undisputed evidence that TruGreen itself viewed the early agreements
as having been superceded. Consequently, the court finds that the new agreements are the
controlling documents and they do not prohibit competition after leaving TruGreen.
Therefore, the court grants summary judgment to Christensen, Murray, and Walker on
TruGreen's breach of contract claim.
B. Tortious Interference Claims Against All New Utah Employees
The New Utah Employees are also entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim of
intentional interference with economic relations because TruGreen has failed to produce
evidence that the New Utah Employees have contacted anyone known to them to be a current or
former TruGreen customer, let alone shown that the New Utah Employees diverted work from
TruGreen because of a desire to harm their former employer.
Under Utah law, the tort of intentional interference with economic relations requires
proof of three elements: (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing
injury to the plaintiff."9 The Utah Supreme Court has recently explained that a plaintiff satisfies
the second requirement by establishing either improper purpose or improper means.10 A plaintiff
9

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 1982); see also
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 331 (Utah 2005).
10

Anderson, 116 P.3d at 331.
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seeking to show improper purpose must show that defendant's predominant purpose of
interfering was to injure the plaintiff, and in this case, it would mean that the desire to harm
TruGreen predominated over legitimate economic motivations. A plaintiff must show that the
defendant was maliciously motivated, "in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm to the
plaintiff for its own sake."11 To show improper means, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
"means used to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations
of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law-rules" including intimidation, deceit,
misrepresentation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood.12
It is not necessary to devote much discussion to the question of the New Utah Employees'
potential liability for tortious interference because no evidence suggests that their diversion of
work, if any, was motivated by a desire to injure TruGreen for the sake of injury. Nor has
TruGreen demonstrated that the interference by theses particular employees, if any, occurred
through improper means. TruGreen's failure to even address the New Utah Employees's motion
for summary judgment is yet another ground to grant summary judgment for defendants on this
claim, as well as the contract claims. For the most part, the parties' assiduous briefing has been
exceptionally thorough, and the court recognizes the difficulty in adequately addressing in a
single memorandum, numerous claims against numerous defendants. Nevertheless, it is not the

11

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

12

Id.; see also St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah

1991).
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job of the court to construct a party's arguments for him.13 TruGreen has failed to supply the
court with evidence of these defendants' breach of contract or tort, not only in its opposition to
defendants' motion for summary judgment, but even in its own motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment for the New Utah Employees, and
dismisses them from the case.14
II. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIMS AGAINST REMAINING EMPLOYEE
DEFENDANTS
In its third cause of action, TruGreen alleges that all defendants intentionally interfered
with its existing and prospective economic relations.15 The court finds that the remaining
defendant employees in this case (Mantz, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, Roehr,
Gaythwaite, Stephenson, and LeBlanc) are entitled to summary judgment against TruGreen on
these claims, primarily for the same reasons why the New Utah Employees are entitled to
summary judgment: there is little evidence of actual contact with TruGreen customers, and even
where contact or diversion is possibly shown, no reasonable juror could conclude from the
evidence supplied that any contact or diversion was done with an improper purpose or by
improper means, as required by both Utah and Idaho law.

u

See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 (10th Cir. 1999).

14

At oral argument on this matter, TruGreen conceded that it would not contest the grant
of summary judgment on these "little fish" in this case. The court directs briefing on the issue of
whether the dismissed defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees below.
15

Amend. C o m p l y 133-38.
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At the heart of TruGreen's claims of tortious interference with economic relationships is
the allegation that the defendants diverted work away from TruGreen and toward Scotts.16
Although it is disputed whether Scotts targeted TruGreen's customers or attempted to solicit
business from persons known to be TruGreen's customers, the evidence produced by TruGreen
to show this contact is minimal. As is more fully discussed below, most of the "evidence" of
contact is no more than a few isolated contacts, sprinkled with admissions that the Scotts
employees may have spoken with TruGreen customers during their work at Scotts.
Because Utah and Idaho have different standards for tortious interference of economic
relations, the court will apply each of these laws where appropriate, but the end result on these
claims is the same.
A. Utah Tortious Interference Claims - Mantz, Gaythwaite, Stephensen, LeBlanc
The parties agree that the tortious interference claims against Mantz, Gaythwaite,
Stephensen, and LeBlanc are governed by Utah law. As explained above, there are three
elements to the tort of intentional interference with economic relations under Utah law, namely:
(1) that the defendant intentionally interferefs] with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff."17
At the heart of this issue is whether Scotts acted for an improper purpose or by improper
means. Under Utah law, a plaintiff seeking to show improper purpose must show that
16

Id.

17

Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 1982); see also
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 331 (Utah 2005).
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defendant's predominant purpose for interfering was to injure the plaintiff; in this case, TruGreen
must prove that these employees' desire to harm TruGreen predominated over their motive to
profit. In other words, TruGreen must show that these defendants were maliciously motivated,
"in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm to [TruGreen] for its own sake."18 Alternatively,
TruGreen could prevail by showing these defendants used improper means. To show improper
means, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the "means used to interfere with a party's economic
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized commonlaw-rules" including intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, defamation, or disparaging
falsehood.19
Although Mantz, Gaythwaite, Stephensen, and LeBlanc appear to have had more
experience and been more senior in status than their New Utah Employee colleagues at
TruGreen, the facts show that these defendants had little to no contact with current or former
TruGreen customers once they started working for Scotts. Moreover, TruGreen has failed to
raise a disputed material fact with regard to whether these defendants acted with an improper
purpose or by improper means. In fact, a close examination of the deposition testimony used to
support TruGreen's position that these employees tortiously interfered with its economic
relations reveals nothing of substance. Stephensen's deposition indicates:
Q: Since terminating employment with TruGreen and working with Scotts,
have you ever contacted any customer of TruGreen in the Ogden area?

"Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
19

Id. at 1003; see also St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 201.
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A: Not to the best of my knowledge
Q: Anybody else that you know?
A: My dad and mom
Q: Anybody else that you know?
A: No. Well, not to my recollection.
Q: Is it possible you could have spoken with former or current TruGreen
customers while you were working with Scotts?
A: When I was at Scotts?
Q: Yeah, while you're at Scotts.
A: Not that I know of.

Q: You have no way of knowing either way?
A: No.20
LeBlanc's deposition indicates:
Q: Do you know if some of the clients that you've contacted on the
commercial side were former TruGreen clients?
A: I've never contacted anybody.
Q: Do you know if some of the clients that you have sold or provided services
to on the commercial side were former TruGreen customers?
A: I have no idea if that's true or not.

Stephensen Dep. 89:5-90:5.
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Q: So it may be true. You just don't know?
A: Correct.21
At most, the depositions show that it was possible that Stephenson and LeBlanc had
spoken with current or former TruGreen customers.22 Mantz, since he began work at Scotts, has
only spoken with two customers, and they were not, to his knowledge, TruGreen customers.
Gaythwaite testified in his deposition that he "has not had any communication with, you know,
current or past TruGreen customers after-the-fact, no, not at all."23 TruGreen as the plaintiff,
however, has the burden of proving actual interference. Moreover, it is an unreasonable leap to
suggest that this deposition testimony, even combined with the other facts and inferences
suggested by TruGreen, demonstrates that the employees were acting for the predominant
purpose of injuring TruGreen, or that their contacts with these customers were done through
improper means as defined under Utah law. Accordingly, the court finds that these defendants
should be granted summary judgment on TruGreen's claims of intentional interference with
economic relations.

21

LeBlanc Dep. 87:23-88:7.

22

The court is aware of Byron Smith's deposition testimony in which he said that his
retention manager said that former TruGreen customers said that LeBlanc said that "he worked at
TruGreen and that he is now at Scotts and would like them to come over." B. Smith Dep. 135:1924. The court grants TruGreen's motion to strike this statement because the statement is triple
hearsay and TruGreen did not address the statement in its opposition. Even if the court
considered the statement, it fails to raise an issue of material fact with respect to LeBlanc's
improper purpose or improper means.
23

Gaythwaite Dep. 189:22-24.
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B. Idaho Tortious Interference Claims - Hiller, Clogston,
Deerfield, Van Acker, Roehr
The parties agree that the tortious interference claims against Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield,
Van Acker, and Roehr are governed by Idaho law. Under Idaho law, a plaintiff alleging tortious
interference with economic relations must demonstrate that (1) there exists a valid economic
expectancy or contract, (2) of which the defendant has knowledge, (3) that the defendants
intentionally interfere with, thereby inducing termination or breach, (4) for an improper purpose
or by improper means, (5) thereby resulting in damage to the plaintiff.24 Clarifying element
number four, Idaho courts require a plaintiff alleging tortious interference with economic
relations to show that "any claimed intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
resulting in injury to the plaintiff is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
itself."25 Despite this somewhat "lower standard" than Utah law, the facts of this case still
warrant granting summary judgment in favor of the Idaho Employees on these claims.
Much like the deposition testimony used to support its claim against the Utah Employees,
TruGreen's deposition testimony offered in support of its claims against the Idaho employees
fails to raise a material issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment on these issues. The
Clogston deposition indicates:
Q: Do you know whether any of the customers you currently provide service
to at Scotts were former customers of TruGreen?
24

Highland Enter., Inc. v. Barker, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (Idaho 1999).

25

Idaho First Nat'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 861 (Idaho 1991) (citation

omitted).
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A: Yes
Q: In fact, some of them were, were they not?
A: Yes26
The Deerfield deposition indicates:
Q: Have you ever fielded calls of any TruGreen customers, to the best of your
knowledge?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: Did they explain to you that they were current TruGreen customers when
they called you?
A: Not - maybe during the course of the conversation that would come up, but
I don't recall anybody calling saying, I am a TruGreen customer and I want to talk
to you.
Q: How would you come up that they were a TruGreen customer?
A: I would ask them if they've had lawn care service in the past or if they
traditionally take care of the lawn themselves just to get an idea as to how best to
approach. You know, if they have had a lawn care company, then I generally
wouldn't have to explain exactly how lawn care companies work, I would just talk
to them about Scotts.
Q: Do you ask them how long they had been a customer of TruGreen? Is that
part of the sales call?
A: I don't generally ask them that.27
The Van Acker deposition indicates:

ClogstonDep. 72:16-21.
Deerfield Dep. 65:20-66:16.
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Q: As a Scotts sales representative have you ever communicated with a
TruGreen customer, either past or present, who you formally solicited yourself as a
TruGreen employee?
A: Yes.
Q: How many times has that happened?
A: Well, two neighbors and one customer who is very demanding, who I did
not contact to sell her Scotts products, however, to let her know who to contact at
TruGreen for any questions or concerns she had throughout the season.
Q: This is what you told her while you were working for TruGreen?
A: While I was working for Scotts.
Q: Okay
A: She was a very demanding customer.
Q: And she subsequently called you back at Scotts?
A: She is also a neighbor at - she is not only a customer but we have
developed a good friendship over the years. We live on the same street - or my wife's
family has a place in McCall, they live on the same street, you know, we see each
other in passing, you know, hi, how are you doing. We became good friends.
Q: Did she say why she switched to Scotts Lawn Service?
A: She was not happy with the TruGreen service or was ready for a change.
One of those; I don't recall.
Q: Did she know that you worked for Scotts at that time when she called you
back?
A: She did. I - when I - yes.
Q: At which point she switched from TruGreen to Scotts after talking to you?
A: She wanted to see what we had to offer.
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Q: What's this individual's name?
A: Her name is Tammy Conrad.28
Once again, the testimony of these defendants, coupled with their history and experience at
Trugreen may raise an issue of material fact with regard to the first element (actual interference),
but nothing provided by TruGreen raises a disputed fact as to whether the conduct was done with
an improper purpose or by improper means. Accordingly, the court grants the Idaho Employees
summary judgment on TruGreen's claim of intentional interference with economic relations.
III. CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYEE DEFENDANTS
Each of the agreements signed by the employee defendants contained similar provisions.
The court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on the following claims: (1) Mantz and
Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment on Trugreen's claim for breach of the noncompetition provision because, even if their most recent non-compete agreements are enforceable
under Utah law, both provisions do not prohibit post-employment competition; (2) LeBlanc,
Stephensen, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on the
claim for breach of the non-interference provision because there is no evidence that these
defendants induced or encouraged TruGreen employees to leave TruGreen; (3) Mantz,
Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled
to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation provision because

Van Acker Dep. 39:1-40:13.
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there is no evidence that these employees solicited or contacted TruGreen customers with whom
they had actual contact while employed by TruGreen.
A. Breach of the Non-Competition Provision
Mantz and Stephensen are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the noncompetition provision because their most recently signed agreements do not prohibit postemployment competition. Under Utah law, as explained above, a subsequent contract replaces
the terms of a prior contract when (1) there is an existing valid contract; (2) all parties agreed to a
new contract; (3) the new contract extinguishes the prior contract; and, (4) the new contract is
valid.29 In order for a contract to be merged into another, it must be "plainly shown that such was
the intent of the parties; and this is usually where the later contract fully covers an earlier one . ..
."30 A close examination of the "old" and "new" contracts signed by both Mantz and Stephensen
reveals that although they both contained non-competition provisions, the new agreements only
prohibited competition during the time the defendants were employed at TruGreen. Put another
way, the new agreements covered the exact same subject matter (non-competition) with a
variation on the time involved. Also, as the court noted above, TruGreen's letters to Mantz and
Stephensen are undisputed evidence that TruGreen itself viewed the early agreements as having
been superceded. Consequently, the court finds that the new agreements are the controlling
documents and that they do not prohibit competition after leaving TruGreen. The court reaches
29

Ford v. Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15, 22 (Utah 2004); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 279 (1981).
30

Horman v. Gordan, 740 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).
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this conclusion without deciding whether the non-competition provision is enforceable under
Utah law.
B. Breach of the Non-interference Provision
LeBlanc, Stephensen, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and Roehr are entitled to summary
judgment on the claim for breach of the non-interference provision because there is no evidence
that these defendants induced or encouraged any TruGreen employees to leave TruGreen or go to
work for Scotts. Each of these named defendants have provided affidavit testimony that they did
not induce or encourage any TruGreen employee to terminate his or her employment with
TruGreen or go to work for Scotts, or breach any agreement they had with TruGreen. TruGreen
failed to respond to these defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim, and has
otherwise failed to produce evidence contradicting the affidavit testimony of these defendants.
C. Breach of the Non-Solicitation Provision
Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and
Roehr are entitled to summary judgment on TruGreen's claim for breach of the non-solicitation
provision because there is no evidence that these employees solicited or contacted TruGreen
customers with whom they had actual contact while employed by TruGreen. Each of the named
defendants have testified that, since going to work for Scotts, they have not contacted any person
known to them to be a TruGreen customer for the purpose of soliciting the person's business for
Scotts. As has been outlined above, TruGreen has presented deposition testimony that
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demonstrates that some of these defendants may have done so, but TruGreen has failed to present
any admissible evidence to refute the testimony of these defendants on this issue.
IV. OTHER CLAIMS
A, Contract Claims
The court finds that disputed material facts remain with respect to the following claims
and following defendants: (1) breach of the non-competition provision as to Gaythwaite,
LeBlanc, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, Roehr; (2) breach of non-disclosure provision
as to Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker, and
Roehr; and (3) breach of non-interference provision as to Mantz, Gaythwaite, and Hiller. The
enforceability of the non-competition provisions under both Utah and Idaho law is a mixed
question of fact and law and will need to be further developed at trial.
B. Tort Claims
The court finds that disputed material facts remain as to the following tort claims: (1)
tortious interference with economic relations claim against Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside,
Bitton, and Babilis; (2) tortious interference with contractual relations against Mower Brothers,
Scotts, Bitton, Babilis, Mantz, Hiller, and Gaythwaite, and (3) unfair competition claim against
Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, and Babilis.
IV. DAMAGES
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The court will first address defendants' motion to strike TruGreen's expert report and
evidence of damages and will then turn to the issue of punitive damages. Also, the court directs
additional briefing from the parties with respect to attorneys' fees.
A. Motion to Strike Expert Report and Evidence of Damages
Scotts urges this court to strike Mr. Elggren's report and exclude Mr. Elggren from giving
an opinion at trial regarding TruGreen's alleged damages or lost profits. Scotts argues Mr.
Elggren is not qualified to render the expert opinion expressed in his report and the evidence
proffered is not reliable. Although the court finds that Mr. Elggren is qualified to offer an expert
opinion in this case, the court also finds that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this case are not
sufficiently reliable to survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
It is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that any scientific evidence or testimony is both
relevant and reliable before it is admitted into evidence.31 This same gate-keeping function also
applies to testimony and evidence based on "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge.32
Based on Daubert, Rule 702 provides general standards for trial courts to use in assessing the
reliability and helpfulness of expert testimony:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).

32

Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
35

or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.33
In other words, experts must identify the facts and data forming the basis for their testimony so
courts can assess the sufficiency of the facts and data. And to be admissible, experts must base
their opinions on scientific methods and procedures, not mere subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. The court may exclude evidence where it finds "an impermissible analytical gap
exists between the premises and conclusion."34 And it is the burden of the proponent of the
evidence to establish that the requirements for its admissibility have been met, by a
preponderance of the evidence.35
Scotts challenges Mr. Elggren's expertise as well as the reliability of his report.
Accordingly, the court must determine whether Mr. Elggren is qualified by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education to render an opinion in this case, and if the court finds Mr.
Elggren qualified, it must determine whether his opinions are reliable under the appropriate
standard.36
First, Scotts claims that Mr. Elggren is not sufficiently qualified to offer expert opinions.
The court disagrees. Mr. Elggren received his masters in business administration from the
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Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 886 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation and
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Untied States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1983).
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University of Utah in 1977, and has twenty-five years of experience in public accounting. Mr.
Elggren is a certified public accountant, a certified fraud examiner, and a certified insolvency and
reorganization advisor. He has testified concerning the value of assets, liabilities, or businesses,
and has qualified to testify on damages, valuation, accounting, bankruptcy, and other financial
matters in state and federal courts.
Scotts concedes that Mr. Elggren has significant experience regarding forensic accounting
and bankruptcy issues but argues that this experience and background is fundamentally different
from experience regarding valuation, lost profits, and goodwill valuations. Scotts points to the
fact that Mr. Elggren lacks the business valuation certifications that indicate expertise and ability
in evaluating and analyzing markets. Although the court recognizes that Mr. Elggren may not
have the ideal background for providing damages analysis in this case, his lack of certain training
or certification does not necessarily mean that he does not have the required expertise. The court
finds that TruGreen has established that Mr. Elggren is qualified to perform, supervise, and
render opinions regarding damages analysis.
Second, and more seriously, however, Scotts claims that Mr. Elggren's conclusions in this
case are not sufficiently reliable to survive scrutiny under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Having reviewed the matter carefully, the court agrees with Scotts.
The fundamental problem is that TruGreen has not explained how Mr. Elggren could
reliably determine that profits earned by Scotts were in fact stolen away from TruGreen. So far
as the court can determine from reviewing his report, Mr. Elggren essentially assumed that the
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growth in Scotts profits were as a result of the new employees who left TruGreen. There are a
number of problems with this approach. For starters, Mr. Elggren picks 30% as the percent of
customers that Scotts was able to retain as a result of TruGreen employees. The basis for this
figure is not revealed, other than to say it is an "estimate."37 A better term, so far as the court can
tell, is a "guesstimate."38 While this guesstimate might be within the realm of reason, Rule 702
requires more. In order to be admissible, Elggren's report must be reliable under the principles
outlined in Daubert, including "(1) whether the proffered theory can and has been tested; (2)
whether the theory has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and
(4) the general acceptance of a methodology in the relevant scientific community."39 The court
has been given no reason from Mr. Elggren's report to accept the 30% figure, other than that
appears to be about how much Scotts' profits increased in the year 2006 as opposed to 2005.40
But this methodology does nothing more than assume the conclusion ~ that is, to assume that
profits gained by Scotts came from the new employees.
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F. Wayne Elggren, Calculation of Damages, December 4, 2006, ("Elggren Report") at
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103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
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See Elggren Report at 7 (noting that there was in increase in revenue of 38% in 2006
compared to 4% in 2005).
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As a separate and independent reason for rejecting this testimony, the court finds that the
report does not seriously contend with potentially confounding causes of revenue gains and
losses. For example, the defendants have offered as an undisputed fact (and TruGreen has not
contested) that various factors would have to be taken into account in developing such a
calculation. These undisputed relevant factors are:
a.

The specific items of confidential information that allegedly were taken by
each Defendant who previously worked for TruGreen, including the impact
that the use of each specific element of the confidential information could
have on alleged damage elements including sales, profits, margins, expenses,
and management efficiencies.

b.

Historical patterns of financial performance by TruGreen and how
performance allegedly was impacted by the Defendants' alleged acts.

c.

Identification of which customers TruGreen allegedly lost to Mower Bros, as
a result of the actions of the Defendants, or which customers allegedly were
obtained by Mower Bros, as a result of allegedly using Trugreen's
confidential information, utilizing the customer databases from both
TruGreen and Mower Bros.

d.

Analysis that would show that but for the actions of the Defendants,
TruGreen would have obtained the revenues obtained by Mower Bros.

e.

The dates that each defendant quit TruGreen and/or their subsequent hire date
at Mower Bros, and the impact each Defendant allegedly caused to damages.

f.

The effect of TruGreen's Ogden location closing and its impact on both
Defendants' decision to leave TruGreen and damages allegedly resulting
therefrom.

g.

Alternative reasons for TruGreen's decreased sales and profitability in 2006,
including levels of advertising, weather, regional economic factors,
population growth, publicity, market acceptance of products and services,
business life cycle issues, pricing differences, competitive forces, quality of
products and customer services, and management decisions.
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h.

Alternative reasons for Mower Bros.' increased sales and profitability in
2006, including levels of advertising, weather, regional economic factors,
population growth, publicity, market acceptance of products and services,
business life cycle issues, pricing differences, competitive forces, quality of
products and customer services, and management decisions.

i.

Alternative reasons as to why Mower Bros, was able to retain customers in
2006 that it obtained in 2005 other than by using confidential information
from defendants, including levels of advertising, weather, regional economic
factors, population growth, publicity, market acceptance of products and
services, business life cycle issues, pricing differences, competitive forces,
quality of products and customer services, and management decisions.41

The defendants have also proffered, as undisputed facts, that "[a]ll of these issues directly
relate to a proper assessment of damages and impact the calculation of damages. These issues
are not adequately addressed, or were not considered by Mr. Elggren in preparing his report."42 In
its response, TruGreen has not challenged these facts. Therefore, by rule,43 these facts are
admitted for purposes of the motion. In light of those undisputed facts, the court is required to
conclude that Mr. Elggren's report is not reliable.
In addition, a change in the circumstances of this case renders the report speculative.
TruGreen has recently stipulated to the dismissal of nine employees. While these were more
lower-level employees, surely, if Mr. Elggren's theory is true, they had at least some role in the
increased profits. His report indicates that it is based on the damage caused by all eighteen

Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Strike If 24.
Id. \ 25 (citations to Rasmussen affidavit omitted).
DUCivR56-l(c).
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employees originally sued in this case. Therefore, the court lacks admissible evidence of what
damage is attributable to the nine employees remaining in this case.
Finally, TruGreen argues briefly in its response brief that its goodwill has been damaged
by the defendants' action, as proven by a franchise agreement between Scotts and the defendants.
It may well be that plaintiffs goodwill has been damaged. The narrow question before the court,
however, is whether Mr. Elggren's report is sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence in
support of the amount of damages. Nothing in Mr. Elggren's report, at least as argued in the
briefs before the court, gives the court sufficient confidence to admit it on the subject of damage
to goodwill. Again, the defendants have addressed this point as an undisputed fact - without
specific response from TruGreen. The defendants urge (correctly so far as the court can
ascertain) that a goodwill calculation requires the expert to "account for any intervening factors
or causes that may have otherwise impacted the difference in the value of the goodwill."44 Yet
nothing in Mr. Elggren's report does that.
Support for the court's conclusion comes from Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Systems,
Inc.45 In Storage Technology, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment for
Cisco on Storage Technology's claims of interference with contractual relations, inducing breach
of contract, corporate raiding, conversion, misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of
fiduciary duties, because Storage Technology failed to produce evidence supporting any amount

Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Strike 143.
395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2005).
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of damages or restitution.46 The dispute arose out of NuSpeed Internet Systems' hiring of a
number of Storage Technology's employees. Storage Technology's expert, George Norton,
calculated a restitutionary remedy for the alleged damages stemming from this employee shift of
$450 million - the exact amount for which Cisco purchased NuSpeed.47 Finding Norton's report
to be too speculative to be admissible, the court noted:
The first and most apparent problem with Norton's testimony is that he attributed the
entire value of the NuSpeed acquisition to employees and trade secrets wrongfully
appropriated from Storage Technology, even though NuSpeed had other assets and
employees. Norton did not attempt to value the people or the technology supposedly
belonging to Storage Technology by any means other than by ascertaining what price
Cisco paid for NuSpeed.48
Like the expert in Storage Technology, Mr. Elggren has not attempted to value the goodwill
supposedly belonging to TruGreen by any other means other than by pointing to a franchise
agreement between Mower Brothers and Scotts.
In reaching its conclusion, the court is aware that the plaintiff has not had an opportunity
to depose the defense expert, Mr. Rasmussen. However, none of the court's conclusions could
be affected by cross-examination of Mr. Rasmussen. The undisputed facts recounted above,
while relying on Mr. Rasmussen's affidavit for support, have not been challenged by TruGreen.
Therefore, they are deemed admitted, regardless of what subsequent evidence TruGreen might

M a t 929.
Id. at 926.
Id.
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develop. Put another way, the problem here is TruGreen's failure to develop its affirmative case,
rather than the need for Scotts to develop some case of its own.
In light of these facts, the court will preclude damage testimony from Mr. Elggren at trial.
The question then arises as to whether this entire case must be dismissed. The court's tentative
impression is that it need not be dismissed, as the plaintiff might be able to prove nominal
damages or perhaps some form of restitutionary damages in other ways. The court trusts,
however, that the parties will brief this point in pre-trial submissions so that the court may have a
fuller understanding of this issue before ruling.
B. Punitive Damages
The court finds that TruGreen is precluded from seeking punitive damages in this case.
Punitive damages are reserved for cases where the defendant's conduct was "willful or
malicious."49 The Utah Court of Appeals, in Promax Development Co. v. Mattson, upheld a
district court's denial of punitive damages in an intentional interference with economic relations
case, even though the district court expressly found that ProMax acted maliciously.50 The
Promax court noted that "where a party prevails on an interference with prospective economic
relations claim based on the improper purposes alternative of recovery, that party must show
additional aggravating circumstances to recover punitive damages."51 Also, as correctly pointed

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1219 (Utah 1983).
943 P.2d 247, 260 (1997).
Id.
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out by the defendants, "punitive damages are reserved for the most unusual and compelling
circumstances."52 "There must be some element of outrage normally present in the commission
of crimes or intentional torts."53
TruGreen has failed to demonstrate additional aggravating circumstances, and the facts of
this case are not so unusual or outrageous as to justify punitive damages. Consequently, the court
eliminates punitive damages as a form of potential recovery for TruGreen.
C. Future Briefing
In light of the court's ruling on damages, the court expects additional briefing on the
implications of the exclusion of Mr. Elggren. In particular, the court would appreciate briefing
on whether the entire case must now be dismissed or whether plaintiff can prove damages in
other ways. The court also expects briefing on whether the dismissed defendants are entitled to
attorneys' fees. These, and all other issues regarding damages, will be discussed at the damages
hearing scheduled for February 28, 2007, at 10:30 a.m.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Scotts' motion for summary
judgment (#175; #181; #183; #185; #187) and GRANTS Scotts' motion to strike TruGreen's
expert report and evidence of damages (#202). The court DENIES TruGreen's motions for

Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Son Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 955 (Idaho 1980).
Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 62 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983).
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summary judgment (#151 and #177). Defendants' various motions to strike are MOOT (#217;
#228; #245), unless specifically addressed herein.
SO ORDERED.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Paul G. fcassell
United States District Judge
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TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L L C , a
Delaware limited liability company, et al,
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v
MOWER BROTHERS, INC , et al,
Defendants

Case No 1 06CV00024

This second phase of summary judgment arguments requires the court to determine
whether its prior order striking TruGreen's expert report and precluding the expert from
testifying at trial necessitates dismissal of TruGreen's entire case against Defendants As an
initial matter, the court finds that TruGreen has failed to provide any persuasive arguments as to
why the court should reconsider its order striking Mr Elggren and thus DENIES TruGreen's
motion to reconsider (#258) Moreover, the court GRANTS Defendants' motions to strike
deposition exhibit 93 (#262) and strike and exclude lay or expert testimony of Mitchell Smith as
to damages (#268) With this backdrop, the question becomes whether TruGreen has provided
sufficient evidence of causation and damages from other sources to preclude summary judgment
The court finds that, with respect to the Idaho claims, TruGreen has failed to provide sufficient
evidence to preclude summary judgment under Idaho law
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TruGreen contends that it has provided the court with sufficient evidence of causation
and damages to support both a lost profits theory and an unjust enrichment theory of damages,
even in the absence of Mr Elggren's expert report The unjust enrichment theory measures
damages by the amount of defendant's profits, while the lost profits theory measures damages as
the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of the breach TruGreen maintains that it can
demonstrate that it was damaged by each defendant's alleged wrongful conduct by offering the
testimony of TruGreen officers and upper management, who can testify as to TruGreen's
business practices, their personal interactions with the defendants, and their observations on the
decline of TruGreen's sales and the success of Mower Brothers At the very least, TruGreen
argues that its potential entitlement to nominal damages precludes the court from disposing of the
case on summary judgment
Defendants argues that m the absence of Mr Elggren's report, there is no evidence in the
summary judgment record from which a reasonable juror could estimate damages Defendants
contend that TruGreen's proposed lay witnesses are not qualified to opme as to what alleged lost
profits were sustained as a result of any of the Defendants' actions, including an inability to
assess the various intervening causes that impact damages Moreover, even if these witnesses
were qualified to provide damages testimony, Defendants assert that these witnesses' testimony
still fails to demonstrate any damages caused by the Defendants Lastly, should TruGreen be
entitled to nominal, and only nominal damages, Defendants assert that summary judgment would
still be appropriate because they should not be burdened with a trial under such circumstances
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The court finds that TruGreen has failed to produce evidence that would raise a
reasonable inference supporting causation and damages under a lost profits theory of damages
TruGreen has failed to provide any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection between
TruGreen's alleged damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of the Idaho defendants In
arriving at this conclusion, the court only considered evidence in the summary judgment record a record that contains little actual testimony showing damages and causation The court finds
that even if the lay witnesses identified by TruGreen are qualified to testify regarding damages,
these witnesses' testimony fails to show how the Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct damaged
TruGreen Because Idaho has expressly adopted a lost profits measure of damages for the claims
at issue, the court finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment for Defendants on all of
TruGreen's Idaho claims Finally, the court finds that TruGreen's potential entitlement to
nominal damages does not preclude summary judgment because Idaho courts decline to remand
cases for trial when a plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages and TruGreen's "non-monetary"
reasons for proceeding to trial are unpersuasive
With respect to the Utah claims, however, the court finds that no Utah court has expressly
addressed the appropriate measure of damages for the Utah claims at issue in this case
Consequently, the court will certify questions to the Utah Supreme Court regarding the proper
measure of damages for the breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with
contractual and economic relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act
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Accordingly, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion for
summary judgment - granting summary judgment for Defendants on all of TruGreen's Idaho
claims.

BACKGROUND
In its summary judgment order dated February 13, 2007, the court addressed the parties'
cross-claims for summary judgment as to all Defendants and as to all claims. The court denied
TruGreen's motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court declined to grant summary judgment for
the following defendants on the following claims: claims against Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van
Acker, Roehr, Gaythwaite, and LeBlanc for breach of the non-competition covenant; claims
against Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc and Stephensen for breach of the confidentiality provision;
claims against Mantz, Gaythwaite, and Hiller for breach of non-interference provision; claims
against Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, Babilis (collectively "Mower Brothers"), and
Mantz, Hiller, and Gaythwaite for intentional interference with contractual relations; and claims
against the Mower Brothers for intentional interference with economic relations and unfair
competition.
Also contained in the court's February 13th summary judgment order is a section on
damages in which the court granted Defendants' motion to strike Mr. Elggren's expert report and
preclude him from testifying at trial. The court directed the parties to brief the issue of whether
the court's preclusion of damage testimony from Mr. Elggren should result in the entire case
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being dismissed In addition to the briefs explaining the parties' respective positions on the
damages issues, the court received a motion to strike and exclude lay or expert testimony of
Mitchell Smith as to damages, a motion to strike Deposition Exhibit 93 and all reference to
Exhibit 93 in TruGreen's damages memorandum, and, a motion to reconsider the court's order
striking Mr Elggren
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law "* In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovmg
party 2 Because the heart of this motion regards the issue of damages, summary judgment will be
denied if there is a genuine issue of fact from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the
respective Defendants caused damage to TruGreen as a result of their alleged wrongful conduct 3

1

Fed R Civ P Rule 56(c), Hutchinson v Pfeil, 105 F 3d 562, 564 (10th Cir 1997)
(citing Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 U S 317,322(1986))
2

Byers v City of Albuquerque, 150 F 3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir 1998)

3

See Walter v Stewart, 67 P 3d 1042, 1047 (Utah Ct App 2003) (declining to rule as a
matter of law on a legal malpractice claim because a party produced evidence raising "a
reasonable inference supporting both actual and proximate causation")
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DISCUSSION
The court must determine whether its prior order striking Mr. Elggren's report and
precluding him from testifying at trial necessitates dismissal of TruGreen's entire case against
Defendants. The court finds that TruGreen has failed to produce evidence that would raise a
reasonable inference supporting causation and damages under a lost profits theory of damages.
Because Idaho has expressly adopted a lost profits measure of damages for the claims at issue,
the court finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment for Defendants on all of TruGreen's
Idaho claims. However, no Utah court has expressly addressed the proper measure of damages
for the breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with contractual and economic
relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act. The court, therefore, withholds
judgment on the Utah claims and will certify questions regarding these damages issues to the
Utah Supreme Court.
A. Analysis Under a Lost Profits Theory of Damages
Although TruGreen seeks the application of an unjust enrichment measure of damages, it
nevertheless contends that it has provided sufficient evidence of causation and damage to support
a lost profits theory of damages. A lost profits measure of damages is the amount of profit lost to
the plaintiff because of the breach, tortious interference, or unfair competition.4 TruGreen asserts
that it can prove causation and damages under a lost profits theory through lay witness testimony
and other evidence, even in the absence of Mr. Elggren's expert report. Specifically, TruGreen

4

See, e.g., Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idahol983).
6
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maintains that it can demonstrate that it was damaged by Defendants' conduct by offering the
testimony of TruGreen officers and upper management, who can testify as to TruGreen's
business practices, their personal interactions with the Defendants, and their observations on the
decline of TruGreen's sales and the success of Mower Brothers Also, TruGreen contends that
these witnesses may offer testimony regarding (1) confidential information that has transferred
into revenue gains for Defendants, (2) TruGreen's past financial performance, (3) TruGreen
customers lost to Defendants, (4) the causal relationship between the employee defendants
breach/departure and TruGreen's damages (including "Exhibit 93," which compares the total
revenue generated by the defendants in 2005 with the 2006 revenue generated by newly hired
employees), and (5) any other potential confounding cause of TruGreen's decreased sales m
2006 At the very least, TruGreen argues that it is entitled to nominal damages should they
prevail at trial on their breach of contract claims
Defendants counter that in the absence of Mr Elggren's report, there is no evidence m
the summary judgment record from which a reasonable juror could estimate damages
Defendants argue that TruGreen's proposed lay witnesses are not qualified to opine as to what
alleged lost profits were sustained as a result of any of the defendant's action, including an
inability to assess the various intervening causes that impact damages Moreover, even if these
witnesses were qualified to provide damages testimony, Defendants asserts that these witnesses'
testimony still fails to demonstrate any damages caused by the Defendants Should TruGreen be
entitled to nominal, and only nominal damages, Defendants maintain that summary judgment

7
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would still be appropriate because Defendants should not be burdened with a trial when there are
only nominal damages available
The court agrees with Defendants and finds that TruGreen has failed to provide the court
with evidence that would raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages
TruGreen has failed to provide any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection between
TruGreen's alleged damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of the Defendants Even if the
court were to consider (which it will not) what appears to be TruGreen's best possible evidence
of damages - Mitchell Smith's testimony and his ability to testify as an expert, that TruGreen has
not met its budgeted figures m 2006, and Exhibit 93 - this evidence still fails to show the
requisite causal connection because (1) there is no testimony establishing that any of the
Defendants were responsible for TruGreen's alleged failure to meet its 2006 budget, (2) a
comparison of the employee defendants' 2005 sales with the 2006 sales of other new TruGreen
employees does not show a relationship between TruGreen's alleged losses and Defendants'
gains, and, (3) Mr Smith has not provided any evidence showing what damage is attributable to
the Defendants remaining in this case In fact, TruGreen has failed to produce any evidence of
what damage to TruGreen is attributable to any of the Defendants
A critical problem with TruGreen's position is that it lacks support in the summary
judgment documents As Defendants noted in their reply brief, "TruGreen merely recites the
allQgcd foundation it intends to provide at trial for its lay witness testimony, without reciting
actual testimony in the summary judgment record demonstrating what damages purportedly were

8
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caused by defendants."5 Specifically, TruGreen's identification of lay witness testimony and
other evidence supporting its prima facie case - under the headings: specific items of
misappropriated confidential information, TruGreen's past financial performance, TruGreen
customers lost to [Mower Brothers], the causal relationship between the employee defendants
breach/departure and TruGreen's damages, impact of hire dates on TruGreen's losses and
Defendants' revenue gains, effect of the Ogden consolidation on TruGreen's damages, and any
other potential confounding cause of TruGreen's decreased sales in 2006 - do not reference a
potential calculation or measure of damages other than profit decreases by TruGreen and gains by
Defendants. This is insufficient under a lost profits theory of damages.
The court recognizes that calculating damages in these types of cases can be extremely
difficult, and in its skillful briefing on this issue, TruGreen has cited many courts that have held
such.6 But this difficulty does not excuse TruGreen from its obligation to provide reasonably
specific damages calculations for each defendant when operating under a lost profits theory of
damages - a theory expressly adopted by Idaho courts.
In Dunn v. Ward, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the "measure of damages for the
breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount that the plaintiff lost by reason of the

5

Def.s' Reply Damages Mem. 3.

6

See, e.g., Nat'lMerch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976) (applying an
unjust enrichment measure of damages in a non-competition case in part because of the difficulty
of measuring damages under a lost profits theory).
9
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breach."7 The Dunn court erased any doubt as to the proper measure of damages for breach of
anti-competition agreements in Idaho when it noted that a "plaintiff must prove that he was
injured by the breach and show the amount of damage caused to him. The measure of damages
is not the amount of profits made by the defendant, rather it is the amount of profit lost to the
plaintiff because of the breach."8 Much like TruGreen, the plaintiff in Dunn "presented no
evidence at all showing any loss of business, loss of customers or loss of profit to his own
business attributable to [defendant's] breach. In addition, although [plaintiff] presented some
proof of [defendant's] profits, he failed to show any relation between those profits and
[plaintiffs] losses."9 Supporting a lost profits theory of damages for tortious interference claims,
the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "in cases of tortious interference with an established
business that damages for loss of anticipated earnings or profits must be shown with reasonable
certainty."10
Unfortunately for TruGreen, because Idaho courts have adopted a lost profits measure of
damages for the relevant Idaho claims in this case, and because TruGreen has provided the court
with no evidence that would raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages, the
court finds it appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all Idaho claims

7

670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983).

"Id
9

Id. at 62.

10

Nora v. Safeco Ins. Co., 571 P.2d 347 (Idaho 1978) (internal quotations omitted).
10
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under a lost profits standard. However, because TruGreen may be entitled to nominal damages,
it argues that this court should allow it to nevertheless proceed to trial on its Idaho claims. The
court disagrees.
B. Potential Entitlement to Nominal Damages
Having found that TruGreen has failed to produce sufficient evidence supporting
causation and damages under a lost profits theory, the court turns its attention to the issue of
whether the court should nevertheless allow TruGreen to proceed to trial on its Idaho claims.
TruGreen asserts that it is entitled to proceed to trial on the merits even if it is only entitled to
nominal damages because prevailing on its contract claims at trial would potentially result in the
recovery of attorney fees and would allow TruGreen to vindicate its rights regarding the
enforceability of its non-competition agreements. Defendants contend that an entitlement to
nominal damages does not preclude summary judgment in their favor because Utah and Idaho
courts consistently decline to remand cases if the damages are only nominal, and TruGreen
should not be allowed to burden Defendants with a trial if only nominal damages are available.
The court is persuaded that TruGreen's potential entitlement to nominal damages does
not preclude summary judgment for the Defendants on all Idaho claims for the following three
reasons. First, the court finds sufficient support under Idaho case law for the granting of
summary judgment where there are only nominal damages available to the plaintiff.11 Second,

11

See Roemer v. Green Pastures Farms, Inc., 548 P.2d 857, 859 (Idaho 1976)
("Assuming without deciding that the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages, we will not
reverse 'for mere failure to allow nominal damages where, as here, the issue is one of damages
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the court is not persuaded that a "victory" at trial for TruGreen on its contract claims will result
in recovering its attorney fees under Idaho law.12 Third, TruGreen has asserted an interest in a
"declaration from a court that its Employee Confidentiality/Non-Compete Agreement is
enforceable as a matter of law."13 This argument for proceeding to trial is also unpersuasive to
the court because (1) it is not clear whether a jury would find the facts necessary to hold the noncompetition agreements enforceable, and (2) any such finding by the jury would be limited to the
facts of the individual employees. In other words, just because the "court" might conclude that
the non-competition agreement was enforceable to a particular defendant in this case does not
mean that the agreement would be enforceable for any other employee. Such a finding would
have minimal precedential value.
The court's decision on this issue is further supported by the defamation case Lamb v.
Rizzo, in which the Tenth Circuit refused to remand a case for assessment of nominal damages
because of the burden on the defendant of going to trial.14 Granted, the defendant in Lamb was

alone.'") (citing Weaver v. Pacific Finance Loans, 487 P.2d 939, 941 (Idaho 1971)); Aim v.
Johnson, 275 P.2d 959, 960 (Idaho 1954) ("Courts will not reverse a judgment for a defendant
merely for the purpose of permitting the recovery of nominal damages where no question of costs
and no important or substantial rights are involved.").
12

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B) ("In determining which party to an action is a
prevailing party and entitled to [attorney fees], the trial court shall in its sound discretion
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties.").
13

PL's Reply to Def.s' Damages Mem. at 17.

14

391 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2004).

12
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incapable of sustaining other harm - a "libel-proof plaintiff' - but the policy considerations
remain the same. In addition to the burden on Defendants, the court is also sensitive to the
burden placed on the citizens of this state that may be called for jury duty. TruGreen's potential
entitlement to nominal damages does not preclude the court from granting summary judgment for
Defendants on all remaining Idaho claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court grants summary judgment for defendants
Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, David Van Acker, and Tammy Roehr on all of
TruGreen's claims against them; and the court grants summary judgment for defendants Mower
Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, and Babilis on all claims against them that arose in Idaho.
SO ORDERED.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Paul G. Cassell
United States District Judge
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